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OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
This thesis has three main objectives. To provide a thorough review of the theoretical foundation of 
corruption in economics, introduce the methodologies and their main results and lastly design an 
economic corruption experiment addressing mechanics and importance of reciprocity for individuals 
in comparison to other moral costs of corruption. 
 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
Theoretical foundation reviewed in the thesis comprises of both theoretical and practical aspects of 
corruption. Theoretical part includes definitions and main categories of corruption while the practical 
part introduces the real world mechanics of corruption and the challenge they pose for development 
of a unified theory of corruption and anticorruption policies. 
METHODOLOGIES 
While this thesis introduces all five main approaches to corruption research in economics; perception 
indices, surveys, observation and lab and field experiments, special emphasis is placed on the latter 
two that comprise the experimental approaches of corruption research. The experimental approach 
is shown to have revolutionized an otherwise stagnant field of economics and holds great promise as 
a research tool for the notoriously difficult research subject of corruption. 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
This thesis provides a complete design, motivation and theoretical foundation for an experiment of 
the corrupting effects of reciprocity in bribery. As reciprocity is identified to be the key mechanic of 
bribery, this experiment intends to examine and value the effects of reciprocity on individual’s 
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1. Introduction   
 
Corruption today is like the dark matter of economics. It is difficult to measure let alone to 
observe. It is a pervasive force in all economies in the world yet its mechanics have so far 
been poorly understood and scarcely researched. Corruption is publicly regarded as 
immensely undesirable and unfair phenomenon and often accredited as one of the leading 
causes of economic adversity. No-one knows the exact figures of corruption in the world 
aside from crude estimates due to corruption being difficult to measure let alone to observe. 
After two decades of definitional debates scientific community settled on defining 
corruption as the abuse of public office for the private gain (Farrales 2005). This definition 
has been since refined further into various sub-types of corruption.  
Corruption has been part of economic systems since the dawn of organized civilization, but it 
has only recently been taken as a serious research subject. The issue of corruption is very 
complex, veiled in secrecy and highly informal. Often merely observing corruption is not 
enough, but an observer also needs to know what to look for in order to detect it. 
Corruption has been poorly explained through application of economic theory beyond the 
point that people do respond to economic incentives, but there are many unknown factors 
and mechanics at play. This fact has come up many times in the failures of anti-corruption 
policies (Persson, Rothstein & Teorell 2012). While these policies might sometimes work, 
most often than not they remain ineffective or worse, counterproductive and fostering 
corruption rather than deterring it. 
These issues have been reflected in methodologies of corruption research that aims to 
uncover hard realistic data at cost-effective and replicable methods. The answer for this has 
come in the form of experimental research that has revolutionized the field for the last 
decade. A surge in corruption literature testifies to the merits of the new method 
(Lambsdorff 2012) although it is still at its infancy and remains to be mastered as a method 
by the research community at large. 
In corruption research experiments have targeted mostly bribery. These bribery experiments 
specifically study the effects of moral costs on decision-making of an individual, as rational 
choice (on which most economic analysis is based on) often precludes moral costs. This is 
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usually due to the unquantifiable and highly idiosyncratic nature of moral costs. However it 
is important to understand the impact and mechanics of these costs. After all, the success of 
countries categorized as low corruption is usually attributed to the honesty of their officials 
rather than to a “good system” of catching corruption. An honest person can thus be 
described as a person with high moral costs. 
Reciprocation and trust are two central tenets of bribery. Both are required for continuous 
bribery to exist. Much of the bribery research focuses on mechanics of reciprocation as 
either one or multiple round games, but I encourage taking this line of analysis even further 
and study the effects of reciprocation in isolation from other factors. The effect can be 
partially quantified by comparing its moral benefit to the moral costs of corruption. This can 
be conducted under both laboratory and field experiment settings which I will describe later 
in detail. Benefits of this research can help us explain political corruption and shape policy 
on lobbying that is considered by leading economists as legalized corruption (Roubini 2011).  
In this thesis I intend to provide an exhaustive account of effects and mechanics of 
corruption as well as their theoretical and even historical context. Understanding the 
complexity involving the topic of corruption is necessary in creation of meaningful research. 
To this end I will also be introducing the colorful methodology of the subject, but will focus 
my literature review on experimental research of bribery and reciprocity.  In order to 
promote experimental research methodology in corruption and showcase it, I will be 
designing two experiments of which one is conducted under lab condition while the other is 
a field experiment where subjects are unaware of the experiment. These experiments are 
intended to pit moral costs of corruption against the moral benefits of reciprocity. The thesis 
contains detailed instructions and material for both experiments as well as guidance for 
conducting and analyzing their results. 
The thesis can be regarded to consist of two sections:  theoretical and experimental. The 
theoretical sections includes the first three chapters. In chapter one of the thesis I will focus 
on definition, effects and theoretical aspects of corruption with intent to provide an 
exhaustive description of what is meant by corruption in economics, what are its effects and 
how does it work in real life. Chapter two introduces the existing research methodology, its 
purposes and main lines of research. I will also discuss the efficacy and merits of each 
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method. In the third chapter I will go over the existing literature on experimental corruption 
research of bribery and its various lines of research. 
The experimental section comprises of chapter four through six. I begin it in chapter four 
with a theoretical discussion of the experimental design, addressing certain research 
challenges and laying out my hypothesis of moral benefits of reciprocity. Chapter five will 
discuss experimental theory from which experiments were derived and address 
methodological concerns of experiments in general. It will also contain specific experiment 
instructions for laboratory and field experiments respectively. In chapter six I propose an 
analysis guide for the experiments as well as my hypotheses regarding the results of the 
experiments. Lastly, chapter seven summarizes both parts and provides my conclusions 
regarding these types of experiments as research tools for corruption in economics. 
 
1.1. Definition of Corruption 
 
I find it important to being this paper with a short discussion on how corruption in 
economics is defined and the reasons behind it. Unlike most economic topics like 
unemployment or interest rates, corruption can be interpreted in many ways. Thus in order 
to conduct and interpret research in any meaningful way it is necessary to begin by defining 
precisely what corruption in economics is and what it is not. I will start with a general 
discussion on corruption as a topic of public and economic interest and finally, I distill it into 
a formal definition and categorizations used in modern economics.  
Corruption is a relatively new economic variable in terms of general and academic interest. 
Until 1990s corruption did not receive widespread attention on a macroeconomic level in 
the public or academic circles. The first notable economic inquiry into the matter came in 
the form of a paper “The Economics of Corruption” by Rose-Ackerman (1974). It was a 
combination of applied microeconomic methods and principles of Industrial Organization to 
devise contracting procedures that would reduce criminal incentives of corruption. However 
economists were not inspired by this new field of interest both because of high 
methodological challenges as well as a relatively low public interest compared to other 
important economic variables of the day such as inflation and exchange rates. With the 
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liberalization of trade and the replacement of communist regimes with capitalism, interest 
towards corruption begun to rise, both because the problem became more visible and 
development of new research methods namely behavioral economics. 
Nowadays corruption is widely known phenomenon and the public view on corruption is 
generally negative. But even though corruption is pervasive and significant around the world 
(Shleifer & Vishny 1993), attitudes towards corruption are affected heavily by cultural bias 
and vary across countries (Paldam 2002). In some countries corruption is regarded as a 
highly criminal activity while in others, usually where corruption is more prevalent, it is 
tolerated and even regarded as a part of life. However, in general the attitude towards 
corruption is without exception always negative, with only the degree tolerance changing. 
Another interesting aspect of corruption is that it has considerably evolved over time. 
Compared to a usual economic variable like the unemployment, activities regarded as 
corrupt have changed and still change almost on annual basis. Legislation aimed at 
preventing corruption is constantly evolving to encompass more and new activities (eg: 
legislation on campaign donations in recent years), but the world is adapting to circumvent 
these laws as well (eg: lobbying industry).  
So what is meant by corruption? One way to describe corruption is to call it a tax (Shleifer & 
Vishny 1993). In its essence, corruption is a trade of public resources for a private gain. 
Public officials who are the keepers of public resources have an economic incentive to 
participate in a trade that would convert resources that are public into gains that are private 
ie: their own. Shleifer & Vishny (1993) note that in most cases goods sold by government 
officials are not pursued for their own sake, but enable the private agents to pursue an 
economic activity they couldn’t pursue otherwise. These goods can be licenses, passports, 
permits or any other sort of document needed to comply with legislation that restricts 
private economic activity.  To discourage this sort of opportunism by the officials, there 
usually exists a number of measures and sanctions that monitor and protect public resources 
against such misuse. The only problem is that they are far from perfect or effective to detect 





Formally corruption in economics is defined as the abuse of public office for private gain 
(Armantier & Boly 2011, Shleifer & Vishny 1993, Aidt 2003).  Shleifer & Vishny (1993) define 
abuse as a sale of government goods which can be material or immaterial. In such cases the 
official is charging personally for the goods or services that are officially owned by the state.  
Technically corruption is a two part process that involves the reception of a benefit and the 
return of one from public resources. The benefit can be material or immaterial and need not 
be purely private, but it must have a private element to it. The nature of the private gain is 
such that it can be an indirect benefit resulting from a public benefit received from the bribe. 
An example of this can be a drug dealer providing narcotics detective information about his 
competitors in exchange for protection from the law. The public benefits from less drug 
dealers on the streets, albeit temporarily, but the detective benefits through his career by 
receiving promotions or bonuses for seemingly good work. 
Strictly defined, corruption can be regarded as a negative (undesirable) reciprocity where 
the welfare of the few is increased at the expense of the many. Reciprocal relations are at 
the heart of corruption as bribes (or gifts disguised as bribes) do not bind the receiver to 
deliver any favors. In the absence of binding or enforceable contracts corrupt dealings 
revolve around the mechanics of reciprocity.  
As previously defined, corruption is an act where an individual wielding the power of a public 
office uses it for personal gain (Jain 2001). From this definition we can further derive the 
conditions that are necessary for corruption to exist. Aidt (2003) has outlined three 
prerequisite conditions: 
1. Discretionary power: the relevant public official must possess the authority to design 
or administer regulations and policies in a discretionary manner. In other words, a 
public official must have some amount of arbitrary control over public resources. 
2. Economic rents: the discretionary power must allow extraction of (existing) rents or 
creation of rents that can be extracted. This is the private agent’s incentive to enter 
into a corrupt agreement. 
3. Weak institutions: the incentives embodied in political, administrative and legal 
institutions must be such that officials are left with an incentive to exploit their 
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discretionary power to extract or create rents. The official’s reward system must be 
flawed in such way that it is advantageous to him to engage in corruption. 
From a theoretical point of view it is necessary to distinguish various approaches to 
corruption in terms of assumptions that govern microeconomic models. Most models and 
economic policies following them have been based on a principal-agent framework (Shleifer 
& Vishny 1993) however an approach based on incorrect assumptions can lead to a 
breakdown of the model in practice (Persson et al. 2012). 
Categories of corruption 
While we have now provided a concise general definition of corruption used in economics it 
is highly useful to clarify it a bit further. From the point of view of model building and theory, 
the definition of corruption is not as simple as its formal definition. Since corruption involves 
assumptions about multiple parties of interest, corruption can be categorized differently 
depending on these underlying assumptions. Olken (2005) provides a very popular broader 
categorization of corruption by dividing corruption into “grassroots” and “high level”.  
Grassroots corruption involves small scale corruption, yet such that can be highly 
widespread. This sort of corruption occurs with low level officials and each transaction is 
small in terms of government budget. An example of this could be bribing a traffic police 
officer to avoid legal consequences for drunk driving. Grassroots corruption is usually more 
visible and known as it occurs more often. It enjoys higher levels of tolerance due to each 
case being basically innocuous in the grand scheme of things. Because of these factors it is 
also the harder one to uproot as a large number of people are involved in it.  
High level corruption occurs in the highest echelons of governmental power and is rarer, but 
is larger in scale. An example of high level corruption would be awarding a multimillion 
infrastructure contract to a private developer without a competitive bidding process. High 
level corruption is much harder to detect since parties privy to it are few in number and take 
great precautions to keep the activity hidden from public view. The greater needs for secrecy 
is motivated by a threat of a major scandal were it to become public knowledge and likely 
carry heavy penalties to all parties involved.  
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Due to the secretive nature of high level corruption, developed countries appear less corrupt 
since they have significantly lower levels of grassroots corruption compared to developing 
countries. However since high level corruption is hard to measure developed countries 
appear disproportionally incorrupt in statistics. (Olken & Pande 2011) 
The importance of assumptions is visible even clearer in various analytical approaches that 
can be taken regarding corruption. Success of a model or theory of corruption is heavily 
dependent on whether the mechanics of the real world match their approach. As I shall 
cover in chapter 1.5, history has shown that anti-corruption policies based on models 
employing incorrect approaches have badly backfired often fostering instead of diminishing 
corruption (Loewenstein et al. 2011) 
While there exists various categorizations regarding these analytical approaches (Alam 1989 
or Rose-Ackermann 1999) I shall use categories as outlined by Aidt (2003) to illustrate the 
importance of correct underlying assumptions of for theory development and model 
building of corruption under research.  
Aidt (2003) divides these approaches into four main categories that have critical distinctions 
in terms of underlying assumptions for models. 
1. Efficient Corruption 
2. Corruption with a benevolent principal 
3. Corruption with a non-benevolent principal 
4. Self-reinforcing corruption 
These approaches may overlap somewhat, but the important distinction between them is 
the degree of benevolence of the government official in charge of implementing policies and 
the designing institutions (the principal) and the role of institutions against their history as a 
determinant of corruption levels.  
Efficient corruption 
Efficient corruption is actually the only positive form of corruption. It facilitates trade 
between agents and creates business that would otherwise not exist. It increases allocative 
efficiency by allowing agents in the private sector to correct pre-existing government policy 
failures. Efficiency enhancing corruption has been studied extensively in economics and its 
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main positive effects are that it can be regarded as a correction mechanism for misguided 
government policies and red tape and viewed as rational market response of pre-existing 
government failures (Aidt 2003).  
Corruption with a benevolent principal 
Corruption with a benevolent principal has been a very common analytical approach that 
has dominated much of the economic research on corruption in the past. It assumes that the 
principal that is delegating the decision making power to an agent (government official) is 
inherently benevolent and strives only to minimize corruption. In this case the level of 
corruption depends on optimization of costs and benefits of institutions. The appeal of this 
approach for economists is clear as standard microeconomic tools can be readily applied 
here. 
Corruption with a non-benevolent principal: 
In the case of a non-benevolent principal the restriction of the principle being immune to 
corruption is relaxed. Corruption in this case arises because non-benevolent government 
principals design ineffective policies on purpose in order to help extract rents from the 
private sector. This reflects a much more realistic picture as benefits of corruption always 
exist and someone always stands to benefit in the end. The level of corruption under this 
approach is dependent on the incentives embodied in existing institution, ie: the range of 
authority of the principals, how far can they modify a policy? 
Self-reinforcing corruption 
Self-reinforcing corruption comes into question when the corruption levels are already high 
and the payoff from corruption is dependent on the prevalence of corruption due to 
strategic complementarity. One example is that a higher prevalence of corruption lessens 
the risk of getting caught and increases the incentives to get in on the action, both for those 
who are doing the actual corruption as well as those who are supposed to police corruption. 
In practice this means that the level of corruption is usually dependent on existing 
institutional culture, history and customs.  
Corruption, like any other crime, can also be a murky concept from the point of view of the 
parties taking part in the process. Most of the time the corrupt official doesn’t feel he is 
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doing anything wrong and in some cultures helping relatives is outright expected.  This is a 
little double standard view because on a larger scale nepotism is condemned yet many 
people condemn those who do not help their kin. 
 
1.2. A brief history of corruption 
 
To get a better understanding of the complex nature of corruption I will demonstrate its 
inter-temporal nature by describing its evolution throughout history. Corruption has and still 
is an ever changing subject that mutates and evolves along with society and culture. I’m also 
a firm believer in the idea that the best place to begin a study for anything is to study our 
past first for history often yields surprising insights and corruption is no exception in this 
regard.   
As time passed the views on what is considered “corrupt” have become more strict and tight. 
Indeed there are many practices in recent history that would be considered as open 
corruption in today’s standards like political campaign financing.  
In this chapter I will go over the history of corruption starting all the way from the ancient 
times for as long as there has been a state and public office there has existed corruption.  
Despite the evolving views and forms of corruption, it has been recognized and documented 
for over 2000 years. One of the oldest and well documented articles include The 
Arthashastra, an ancient Indian treatise on statecraft dated around 400 B.C. and written by a 
man named Kautilya, an advisor and tutor to an Indian emperor Chandragupta Maurya.  The 
ancient book discusses corruption and its prevention in one of its chapters and characterizes 
corruption as inevitable. Kautilya writes that officials find it “impossible not to eat up a small 
bit of the King’s revenue” and continues on to list forty ways of embezzlement by a 
government servant. He stresses that the King must take necessary steps to ensure the 
safety of the merchants and protect the trade from corrupt government officials. The text 
was highly influential and famous until the 12th century when it was lost and recovered only 
in 1904, its first English translation appearing in 1915. It is interesting to note that Kautilya 
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considers corruption as an innate part of any government official. The experiment that I 
derive and later describe in this thesis will partly attempt to confirm this observation. 
More great examples of the prevalence and destructiveness of corruption in ancient times 
are seen in the histories of Rome and Greece. The key factor of the decline and subsequent 
fall of Roman civilization was the steady loss of focus and control over the government as its 
high ranking bureaucrats and military leaders abused it for private gain - the very definition 
of corruption (MacMullen 1988). According to MacMullen’s research corruption spread 
through Rome like cancer eventually crippling the empire with its sheer scale and long-term 
global effects. Rome’s fate is a chilling example of how a powerful and politically developed 
society can destroy itself from within through decadence in the form of corruption. Fates of 
contemporary Greek societies of Athens and Sparta that were the vanguard states to define 
civil liberties are similar to Rome’s. Wilson (1989), attributes the growth of corruption to 
emergence of new social forces born out of booming commerce and increasing imperialism. 
The existing institutions were unable to adapt to growing change and new challenges even 
though attempts were made. For instance in Athens there was formed the famous Council of 
Areopagus which had reporting corruption as one of its primary duties. Unfortunately these 
efforts were not enough and most policies ended up being corrupted and used against the 
very corruption they were meant to safeguard from (Wilson 1989).  
The message of ancient Mediterranean history is clear; as economies grow the corruption 
practices evolve and can lead to great social disaster if ignored. It also spells unequivocally 
that corruption is not just a modern phenomenon and that much could be learned from the 
study of the past as not much has changed in corruption’s highly detrimental effect on 
societies during the last two millennia.  
Aidt (2003) mentions the sale of parliamentary seats in so called “rotten boroughs” in 
England before the Reform Act of 1832 and “machine politics” in immigrant cities in the US 
at the beginning of the 19th century as two concrete historical examples of open political 
corruption although they weren’t regarded as such in their time.  
Park (1997), describes in his paper how corruption and failed attempts at economic reform 
were one of the main reasons for the downfall of Qing dynasty in the early 20th century. 
According to Park some of the eighteenth-century Chinese governors felt so strongly about 
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government corruption that they called it as one of the greatest issues to plague the Qing 
state and society. Still, the corruption took the empire to its seemingly inevitable end. 
However, even after the form of governing was completely reformed, corruption remains in 
China very much as a concern even today.  
History seemed to repeat itself a little less than a century later this time in the neighboring 
Soviet Union. For the western world Soviet Union is perhaps the most evident example of an 
empire crumbling because of corruption. The modern Russia hasn’t seemed to change much 
since Soviet Union as there are extensive reports of rampant corruption that continue to 
plague their society (Levin & Satarov 2000).  
As the world moves closer towards globalization and larger federations, the western world 
has slowly woken up to the fact that corruption poses a major threat for social and economic 
development. Based on a 2014 report on the European Commission website, the corruption 
in the EU is costing taxpayers 120 billion EUR annually.  
Academic interest in Corruption 
In terms of academic interest and comparative approach, corruption was “discovered” in the 
late half of the 20th century. Specifically there has been two periods of heavy academic 
research that can be identified since that time. Curiously, the interest seemed to be fuelled 
mainly by democratization and developmental interests rather than outright necessity. 
(Farrales 2005) 
The first wave of academic interest began in 1950s and went on to early 1970s stemming 
from the heels of decolonization and the height of modernization theory (Farrales 2005). 
However, the focus of the literature was mostly on developed countries and corruption was 
more considered as a “problem of the third world”. Additionally there existed cynicism 
towards political corruption as corruption was more seen to be linked to material gains 
rather than vote and political power.  
Great definitional debates raged on as Moralists debated against Revisionists over the 
proper definition of corruption. The former viewed corruption more of an ethical choice and 
universally condemned it under any circumstance while functionalists saw that corruption 
should be defined and studied more objectively. For functionalists corruption was 
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considered as an inevitable and necessary part of an economy’s adjustment process. (Leff 
1964) 
Eventually the debate ended in mid 1970s after new generation of scholars successfully 
challenged both views by recasting corruption as an individual choice (Rose-Ackerman 1978). 
Corruption was viewed as a carefully calculated decision that at the very ideal circumstances 
could lead to no cost to society, but usually came at a cost. While this view was embraced by 
many and enjoyed great popularity due to its tractability with standard economics, it 
ultimately proved empirically highly inaccurate and interest in corruption waned. (Sequeira 
2012) 
The second and current wave of corruption research began in early 1990s, fueled by 
frustration in many third world countries’ lack of development due to rampant corruption 
(Farrales 2005). While the phenomenon of corruption was far from new, the breakdown of 
communist systems since the end of cold war made it much more visible. As the iron 
curtains came down the sheer size of rampant corruption was revealed and sharply raised 
the awareness of the problem. Another factor that has raised the public awareness of 
corruption is development of mass media where news travels faster around the world in the 
form of electronic data. Development in technology has also provided a channel for people 
suffering from public corruption to voice their concerns.  
Due to the absence of a working unified theory of corruption studies have become largely 
case studies with little effort to develop a unified theory of corruption. Development of 
corruption indices has encouraged cross-national statistical work on the causes and 
consequences of corruption. Some of the most popular indices in the 1990s were Business 
Intelligence (BI), World Competitiveness Report (WCR) and Impulse. I’ll go over these indices 
and other methodologies in part 2.  
Issues that were the focus of study had evolved as well since the first wave. Nowadays 
endemic corruption, political corruption and transnational corruption are receiving 
considerably more attention (Farrales 2005). Starting from the 1990s, western donor 
countries have become unwilling to ignore corruption of third world countries just because 
of the right political orientation of their governments. Another landmark change in public 
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attitude towards corruption was the OECD anti-bribery convention in 1997 which ended the 
very common practice of subsidizing bribes through tax deductibility. 
1.3. Effects of Corruption 
 
As of late corruption has been recognized as one of the most detrimental factors to 
economic and social development (Armantier & Boly 2011, Beylis, Finan & Mazzocco 2012). 
In this chapter I will examine the effects of corruption on the welfare of society. Since there 
are many facets to corruption, its effects are equally diverse. For this purpose I will examine 
the effects in three spheres relevant to society’s welfare: Economic, Political and Social. I 
strive to present a multilateral and holistic approach to the effects of corruption and not 
merely monetary one since virtually anything that can affect the economy, ultimately has 
economic value eg: a political office or the power to write fines. Another point of view is that 
it can be difficult to estimate the monetary value of certain aspects of society that are still 
vital to a functioning economy such as the rule of law. 
I will also examine the motives and mechanics of corruption in each case and present 
empirical evidence from extant literature. Lastly, I will address the issue of efficient 
corruption and review its extant research and antecedents and finish with a discussion of the 
prerequisites and benefits of efficient corruption. 
Economic effects 
Corruption is generally seen as a tax on private sector that ultimately holds back global 
growths and increases poverty (Runde, Hameed & Magpile 2014).  For the past two decades 
there has been an increasing awareness of the severity of adverse effects corruption has on 
economy. In a survey of 144 countries conducted by World Economic Forum, 67 of them 
listed corruption as one of the top three challenges to conducting business in their country. 
According to the World Bank Institute over one trillion US dollars’ worth of bribes is being 
paid annually around in the world which totals 2% of 2012 world GDP (~$58 trillion). Over 
$500 billion is attributed to private sector corruption. This figure is three times as large as all 
foreign assistance paid out in 2012 (Runde, Hameed & Magpile 2014). According to an 
estimate by the Control Risk Group, a consulting company specialized in economic and 
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political risk analysis, developing countries lost close to 1$ trillion in “fraud, corruption and 
shady business transactions” which amounted to 13,7 percent increase from 2010.  
The effects of corruption on the economy are by no means one sided, but have been shown 
to affect it in many different ways.  In addition to direct costs, corruption also carries an 
opportunity cost which is especially relevant for developing countries as it represents lost 
potential growth. This can take the form of discouraged investment or other business 
transactions. Corruption is thus a tax on investment (Runde, Hameed & Magpile 2014). One 
such example is the research by Khwaja & Mian (2005) in Pakistan where they found that 
politically connected firms received 45% larger loans from government banks despite having 
50% higher default rates. They estimated that this carries the cost on annual GDP between 
0,3% - 0,9% as firms with greater potential are left undercapitalized.  
Corruption also increases inefficiencies in the economy. It may raise the marginal tax rate of 
firms and decrease business activity (Olken & Pande 2011). For example bribe payment by 
border officials increases the costs of shipping that acts as an additional import tax. Sequira 
and Djankov (2010) estimated this tax to increase the shipping costs by 14% in South Africa 
and 4% in Mozambique. 
In public sector corruption raises marginal costs of public funds and makes certain 
government projects economically unviable. For example a very common and recurring 
theme in less development countries are bloated road costs. Olken (2006) estimated that 
24% of road costs in Indonesia went to corruption. Anecdotal evidence tells that the figure in 
St. Petersburg, Russia is close 70%. Another example of bloated costs comes from India 
where Niehaus and Sukhtankar (2010) found that the difference between officially paid and 
actually paid labor expenditures were 79%. These types of budget bloats can easily make 
many if not most projects economically unviable or alternatively result in the poorest quality 
work.  
Lastly, corruption has also been shown to hinder trade. Private actors attempt to distort the 
market in order to create monopolies.  Increase of corruption also facilitates the birth rate of 
offshore accounts, sham charities, opaque commissions and other similar fraudulent entities 




Effects of corruption however need not be limited to merely quantifiable monetary, but can 
also have consequences and costs in more intangible forms. A number of papers have 
argued that generally a political cost of corruption undermines the legitimacy and efficacy of 
existing governments (Olken 2006, Faccio 2006, Finan and Ferraz 2010, McMillan and Zoido 
2004, Levin & Satarov 2000).  
More specific characterizations of this are presented by Runde, Hameed & Magpile (2014). 
One such is a reduction in tolerance for public officials seeking to make constructive, but 
difficult changes. Since politicians’ reputation is in tatters already, making more unpopular 
decisions will likely spell certain doom to a politician undertaking unpopular, but necessary 
changes like anti-corruption programs that require strong trust and support of the 
population (Levin & Satarov 2000). And rightly so for often anti-corruption measures turn 
out to be merely a façade for new graft.  
This leads to a very stagnated political arena where elected officials prefer to keep a status 
quo and have no incentive to ruffle the feathers of the electorate any further without a large 
personal gain. This could serve as an explanation to the trend where there are currently so 
many billionaires running for top political offices in Eastern Europe? In terms of society many 
economically and socially important structural and legislative changes may be postponed. 
With the citizens disillusioned by the authorities it will be very hard for any politician to gain 
strong enough backing from the people for implementation of any anticorruption initiatives.  
Another example of how corruption levies a political cost is through public officials receiving 
excessive amounts of discretionary power over regulations and increasing state capture. 
Varese (1997) describes in his paper a number of cases in post-Soviet Russia where state 
agencies had gained wide discretionary powers and became targets for powerful lobbies. 
One such example was tax agencies being able to give tax exemption which most companies 
won through bribery.  Faccio (2006) shows in his cross-country research that a company 
value benefits 2,3% - 4,3% when a businessman or board member becomes a politician in a 
country where corruption is above median. 
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Corruption can also undo the government’s ability to correct externalities which leads to 
inefficient outcomes (Olken & Pande 2011). While the true costs are hard to estimate, Olken 
(2006) estimated a theft of rice from a program that distributed subsidized rice in Indonesia. 
The result was that that 18% of the rice disappeared before reaching households.  
Social effects 
Last, but not least, the sphere of social effects of corruption is perhaps the least quantifiable, 
but arguably the most detrimental. The main effect is the decline in morals of the society 
through diminishing moral costs that affects the existing norms. And given that moral costs 
influence the individual decision making regarding the following of the law, their distribution 
in the population influences the overall level of corruption (Della porta and Vanucci 2005). 
An empirical evidence of this would be Levin & Satarov’s (2000) description of post-Soviet 
Russian attitudes to grassroots corruption to be considered an everyday element of life as in 
“by default”. Varese (1997) reports how Russian police neglected to register crimes due to 
political ambitions of its commanders. It is estimated that registered crimes in 1994 made up 
only one third of actual amount of crimes committed.  
Elster (1989) points out that corruption across countries is largely explained by the “public 
spiritedness” of their officials and not the cleverness of the institutional design.  He 
characterizes moral costs as an “immune defense system” of society that tends to weaken as 
moral costs drop. This can explain variations in corruption between countries sharing similar 
institutional conditions. The average moral attitudes have a significant impact on the level of 
corruption. Barr & Serra (2010) showed in their bribery experiment that they could predict 
corruption based on decision makers’ home country. However, they also found out that 
morals tend to converge to the social average and prediction results only applied to 
individuals who had recently moved to UK. Identical experiment played amongst migrants 
with several years of residence behind them showed no significant divergence based on the 
home country.  
The degradation of moral values in social cost of corruption is reflected in extreme 
maximization of individual utility with little to no regard for common wellbeing. An example 
country of this could be Uganda where Reinikka and Svensson (2004), found that schools 
received on average only 13% of grants for non-wage payment with the other 87% stolen by 
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various officials. An example of a particular result of this effect may be an override of safety 
or quality regulations that creates risk for physical harm for general population (Runde, 
Hameed & Magpile 2014). A research paper by Escaleras, Anbarci and Register (2007) finds a 
link between public sector corruption and the deadliness of earthquakes. The authors 
suggest that while earthquakes cannot be prevented, their disastrous consequences can be 
mitigated or even prevented by proper building inspections and honest contractor work. 
Naturally corrupt countries’ officials flaunt safety regulations more often than those of less 
corrupt countries. In addition to costs like these corruption imposes a wide range of social 
costs by also being a major obstacle to reducing poverty, inequality and infant mortality in 
emerging economies (Kaufman 2004). 
Efficient corruption 
Despite its many adverse effects on society corruption is not always undesirable from the 
point of welfare of society. Indeed, the view of efficiency-enhancing corruption has been in 
economics for a long time (Aidt 2003). Ades and Di Tella (1997) even argue that one of the 
reasons of economics neglecting corruption as a research topic for so long was the 
assumption that a bribe is simply a transfer and therefore causes no serious welfare losses. 
For example Gorodnichenko and Peter (2007), showed that on average, public employees in 
Ukraine had the same consumption as their counterparts in private sector despite their 
officials salaries being 24-32 percent lower. In this case corruption didn’t seem to provide 
extra income to public servants as their government pay was exactly offset by the amount 
received in bribes.  
Aidt (2003) defines efficient corruption as corruption that “arises to facilitate beneficial 
trade between agents that would not otherwise have been possible”.  This allocative 
efficiency is achieved by allowing agents in the private sector to correct pre-existing 
governmental failures. These failures could be the result of misguided governmental policies 
or red tape in which case corruption is merely a rational market response to existing harmful 
legislation. The famous study by Leiff (1964) demonstrated this effect where the focus of the 
study was the bureaucracies of Chile and Brazil. The two countries both adopted price 
controls for food products in the early 1960s. In Chile the officials enforced the policies 
diligently and food production stagnated. Brazil on the other hand had a corrupt 
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bureaucracy that sabotaged the controls and food production increased to the benefit of 
consumers.  
It is important to note however that this is the result of second-best reasoning as the 
optimal choice would be to remove harmful price controls themselves. Efficient corruption 
thus requires existing economic inefficiencies. Aidt (2003) describes two specific channels 
through which corruption can turn out efficiency increasing: 
1. Corruptions speeding up the bureaucratic process (greasing the wheels) 
2. Corruptions introducing a competition for a scarce resource resulting in more 
efficient allocation than what otherwise would have been. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1994) study the possibility of bribery facilitating the efficient allocation 
process of resources. They find that bribery is a cheap way to distribute wealth between 
politicians and private actors, because otherwise the resource allocation would be politically 
motivated and much more inefficient. Another possibility is circumvention of a quota system 
that allows only the most efficient firms to gain a license. However, once again, both points 
are assuming an already broken society and efficient corruption turns out to be just a lesser 
of two evils.  
As Aidt (2003) points out, the notion of efficient corruption is based on a number of 
problematic assumptions. The first one being that corruption is always self-serving where 
officials are incentivized to supply a bribe maximizing quantity/quality of goods or services 
rather than the efficient one. The second issue is of a more practical kind where public 
resources are often wasted on keeping corrupt deals secret or for searching suitable 
partners. This reason might also get in the way of efficient allocation for often corrupt 
officials prefer to minimize the chance of detection along with profit. Thirdly, corrupt 
contracts are unenforceable in court which makes a poor foundation for an economy. 
Efficient corruption is thus a short term solution to a major problem. But lastly and most 
importantly, the implicit assumption that corruption is exogenous and unrelated to the 
government failure is highly unrealistic. The unreasonable policies may well be put in place 




1.4. Mechanics of corruption 
 
As I have previously mentioned and explained, corruption is a complex matter compared to 
more ordinary economic variable like unemployment. After all, corruption’s definition alone 
took decades to settle (Farrales 2005) and there still exist many nuances to it that greatly 
affect its mechanics.  
Understanding these factors of corruption and what creates it is critical for planning fair and 
efficient economic systems. I believe this warrants a discussion on mechanics of corruption 
from both practical and theoretical points of view. In this section I will introduce the 
mechanics from both practical and theoretical angles. Practical view is necessary to 
understand the unique challenges posed to economic research of corruption. As corruption 
is clandestine by nature data for it is hard to come by. Direct observation in most cases is 
impossible or dubious at best due to its illegal nature. Theoretical part introduces four 
categories of corruption and showcases applications of the methods of standard economics 
to describe these different forms of corruption.  
As sound theory must be rooted in practice I will begin with a discussion of the ways 
corruption manifests in the world today, trying to isolate its general traits and practices. 
These can be further used in the construction of a theoretical framework. 
Corruption in practice 
Corruption can be a highly multi-faceted and multi-layered process that is often mixed into 
legitimate processes. One of the prevailing themes of corruption is secrecy and informality 
as parties to a corrupt transaction take steps to ensure corrupt transactions are not detected.  
Secrecy is usually achieved through deceit, misdirection and tight networks. Börzel & Pamuk 
(2011) study Southern Caucasus which has ranked amongst the most corrupt areas in the 
world. The researchers describe the public sphere as permeated with tightly organized 
patronage networks and clans. This kind of extensive misuse of social networks greatly 
facilitates corrupt transactions by providing a trustworthy infrastructure. It also makes 
detection virtually impossible as everyone is in on the deal and mutually dependent on 
corrupt arrangements. My personal interview with several Russian state managers and 
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businessmen revealed similar practices. This makes research very difficult although not 
impossible. Members no longer active or non-members held in confidence can provide some 
data on economies with well-established corrupt social networks. 
Another popular measure of secrecy can be the assumption of both roles. A private 
businessman runs for public office or an official opens private businesses. This way private 
agent and the corrupt official are the same person. This effectively eliminates the possibility 
of whistleblowing (Börzel & Pamuk 2011, Levin & Satarov 1999). This sort of arrangement 
undermines many corruption models that rely heavily based on the possibility of 
whistleblowing. 
Misleading is a common trick in countries with high corruption levels. State authorities 
target petty corruption with raids and crackdowns while allowing high level corruption to 
flourish. For example former president of Georgia Mikhael Sakaashvili cracked down heavily 
on corrupt traffic police and several other government agencies putting them under direct 
control of his closest allies. Later he had been accused of turning a blind eye to the major 
corruption and abuse of power by allies in prominent positions. In addition it is common to 
use anti-corruption campaigns against political opponents. (Börzel & Pamuk 2011, Levin & 
Satarov 1999) 
Informality is powered by strong culture and customs which can act as a proxy of unofficial 
law. A measure of trust between parties is thus achieved without resorting to usual 
guarantees such as contracts or deposits. Della Porta & Vanucci (2005) characterize it as a 
development of an alternative language also in part to ensure certain payments are 
regarded as ‘regular, normal and accepted business transactions’.  
This leads to another trick of corruption which is renaming bribes under legitimate 
transactions (Thompson 1993). This can mean disguising bribes as gifts, campaign or 
voluntary donations or payment for services of the official’s private company. In Finland, 
many high ranking government officials sell private consultation or expensive lectures on the 
side, sometimes even art that is subsequently bought by private businesses in bulk. This 
makes it easy to circumvent restrictive legislation on political campaign donations. 
(Koikkanen & Riepula 2010)   
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Another common method to achieve informality is implicit trades. Officials trading favors, 
often for a job in the private sector once the term in the office ends. This leads to another 
variety of bribery which is intangible bribes. Bribes not nominated in any currency, but in 
subjective matters like political power, votes, prestige or vacation trips. To complicate 
matters even further, intangible bribes can be done in reverse through blackmail. In this case 
the mechanics controlling the official’s decision making are not those of greed, but loss 
aversion. Blackmail is usually not monetary, but involves intangible assets such as reputation 
or health of oneself or family. Thus these sorts of bribes can be considered to hold tangible 
economic value, but are extremely hard to measure or quantify. This makes obtaining data 
virtually impossible. 
Exploitation of unsupervised activities is the outcome of corrupt state structure and 
legislation. Laws and regulations are sabotaged to remain vague, complex and full of 
loopholes. This gives officials more discretionary power to exact rents from private sector. 
Varese (1997) points out undeveloped property rights and predatory tax systems as 
particularly common cases in countries with high corruption.  
Finally, there’s also an inevitable side to corruption in countries that have suffered political 
instability and economic collapse. Impoverishment of the population and inability of the 
state to ensure a decent existence to public servants push both sides to violate the law and 
engage in massive grassroots corruption (Levin & Satarov 1999). An example of this is a 
personal experience from the 90s Russia where many traffic police departments gave their 
employees empty fine books in place of salary. The policemen were supposed to hand out 
fines, real or imagined, and pocket the fines as their salary. This is a striking example of a 
case where corruption mechanics are simply those of survival.  
At times, in the cases of efficient corruption, the public is better served with corruption. In 
this case the resulting private benefit is larger than the public expense. This scenario 
however is viable only when the public resources are grossly mismanaged and democratic 





Corruption in theory 
Building a working theories on corruption based on the observed common practices 
discussed above is a challenging task. After all, the debate on its very definition alone took 
decades (Farrales 2005) before settling on corruption being defined as the abuse of public 
office for private gain. However, this definition still leaves corruption open to various 
mechanics depending on what type of corruption is at hand. A simple example of this is 
whether there are bribes involved or not. Building a model with bribes as the defining 
mechanic of corruption will not fit scenarios of active graft where the official simply steals 
from the government for himself, a case of assuming both roles. 
Shleifer and Vishny’s (1993) Theft – No Theft categorization of corruption inspired me to 
create a model to help categorize corruption more effectively. This is a simple model in form 
of a 2 by 2 matrix of corruption. The two dimensions are Passive – Active Corruption 
(horizontal axis) and Corruption with Theft – No Theft (vertical axis). The model provides us 
with a quick and easy way to determine the defining mechanics of corruption in question. 
The matrix below has four quadrants with representative forms of corruption in each of the 
four corruption types: Passive Theft, Active Theft, Passive No-Theft, Active No-Theft. 
 
Matrix of corruption 
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Passive Corruption refers to a situation where the official does not actively pursue corrupt 
activity and the initiative comes from the private sector. Analogously Active Corruption 
means that the official shows initiative himself to engage in corruption. 
Corruption with (without) theft remains as before. It measures whether the state loses any 
of its existing assets to the act of corruption.  To characterize the various quadrants I’ve 
come up with examples of what sort of corruption they could represent. A passive 
corruption with theft can be kickbacks on state contracts. Private sellers promise the official 
a sum of money (often proportionate to the contract value) in exchange for granting a 
government contract to their firm. Passive corruption without theft however can be viewed 
as “grease money”. For example, a payment to speed up a bureaucratic process like a visa 
application or a building permit. 
The top right quadrant of active corruption with theft is just plain graft. The official simply 
appropriates state property to himself usually through the means of embezzlement. The 
final lower right quadrant of active corruption without theft can be extortion. A simple 
example of this would be a police officer harassing passersby for made up problems in their 
documents. The problems can be then fixed with an unofficial fine that is essentially a bribe 
to a legal issue created by the official. 
Using the four distinct forms of corruption in the matrix as a structure I will outline the most 
common analytical approaches in standard economics to corruption. The purpose is to 
present different forms of modeling without going outside the scope of this work by delving 
into them too deeply. 
Kickbacks 
One of the very first theoretical analyses of corruption was written in a paper by Susan Rose-
Ackermann (1974) that formalized corruption in government contracting with private sector. 
In the matrix of corruption this was a case of kickbacks where the bribe was a function of 
private sector’s excess profits. The model examines the decision making of an official and 




The model is intuitive and relatively straightforward and begins by stating the profit 
functions of the official and a private agent.  
Official:   G(Xi) = Xi – J(Xi) – R(Xi) 
Private agent:  πi(Xi) = Piq – Ti – Xi –Di(Xi) – Ni(X) 
Where X is the bribe amount, J(Xi) / Di(Xi) is the cost of penalties in terms of price, income 
and bribe while R(Xi) / Ni(X) represents the moral costs for official and private agent 
respectively. Piq – Ti represents product price times quantity minus total production costs. 
The profit functions are rather symmetrical for both players although the model allows a 
separate moral and punishment cost functions for both public and private sectors.  
In this model a bribe can affect two variables: seller’s identity and terms of sale. All players 
maximize their profits with private agents submitting their bribe bids accordingly. The model 
assumes a rather auction-like environment where unsuccessful bribes are not paid or all 
bribes are paid after the fact.  
Perhaps the first interesting implication of the model is that for corruption to exist there 
needs to be excess profits. In other words perfect competition eliminates corruption 
because no firm can afford bribes nor does it need them as it can sell its products on the 
private market. In case of imperfect markets it follows that the most efficient firms have the 
greatest excess profits and can thus afford the largest bribes. Does this mean then that 
corruption can only lead to efficient outcomes for the government under this kind of model? 
Far from it, bribes can affect the terms of sale, namely the price (P). This in turn directly 
affects the profit functions of firms. The bribe is still paid by the most efficient firm, but the 
deal will be altered either in terms of price or quality of the product. Theoretically in the 
model this can lead to infinite bribes and prices if the second derivatives of the penalty cost 
functions Jxx and Dxx are negative. This means that the penalties are not based on income, 
but bribes and have diminishing returns. This reflects real world’s legislation as most laws 
specify punishment by the size of the bribe.  
Susan Rose-Ackermann (1974) also makes an important distinction in product differentiation. 
If the needs of the government are poorly specified, it makes comparison and evaluation of 
various firms’ offers difficult. The policymakers are thus encouraged to make their 
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preferences as clear as possible and review purchasing decisions. This is somewhat 
confirmed by empirical evidence as many poor countries with high corruption seem to 
pursue the opposite. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) observe that many poor countries prefer to 
spend their meager budgets on rather defense and infrastructure projects where corruption 
opportunities are easier to exploit instead of education and health.  
The model thus concludes that penalty function need to be rewritten in terms of bribes, 
prices and income: J(Pi,Yi,Xi) and Di(Pi,Yi,Xi). However legal remedies might still be insufficient 
even with stiff penalties if the probability of conviction goes down with the severity of the 
punishment as is often the case in the real world. I will discuss this more at length in the next 
chapter on Anti-corruption measures.  
Embezzlement / Extortion 
Corruption is defined as the abuse of public office for private gain. One of the simplest 
interpretations of this can be an official involved in a provision of an official good like a 
passport, import license or the use of government property like roads. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1993) outline an industrial organization method that can be used to model these basic 
assumptions for corruption.  
The first basic important distinction that needs to be made is whether the corruption is with 
theft or without theft. Corruption without theft here means that the government receives all 
the necessary payments from the sale of the official good and corrupt income is the one the 
official is able to charge on top of the government’s fee. Corruption with theft on the other 
hand is the same except that the official retains the entire fee without giving the 
government its share. 
The two cases are conceptually similar and differ only in the level of the marginal cost to the 
official. This fact however has important consequences. In the case without theft corruption 
always raises the total price of the good whereas with theft it can go either way. The figures 




Based on this framework we can model a corrupt official’s decision making with standard 
industrial economics methods. For example in a case where an official faces no competition 
in provision of the official good, it pays to set the marginal revenue equal to the marginal 
cost and reap monopoly profits. In a case without theft the marginal cost is simply zero. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) conclude that this type of analysis suggests a similarity between 
taxes and bribes. Another important notion is that corruption with theft aligns the interests 
of both official and private sector. The private agents get a discount on the government 
good while the official embezzles the rest. 
However, corruption without theft pits interests of the official and private agents against 
each other as now the private agent pays extra on top of the official price. The government 
gets its due and the official collects an informal tax. This amounts to extortion as the official 
has the power to block the purchase of the governmental good without a bribe. 
Like the previous model, this model offers only an imperfect solution to the problem of 
corruption. Both models cannot eliminate corruption so they focus on reducing and 
controlling it.  
The model by Shleifer and Vishny (1993) notes that competition amongst corrupt officials 
would drive the bribes down. It also recommends to avoid possibilities of monopolizing 
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corruption. Unfortunately this requires the officials not to collude that can be difficult to 
achieve in many instances as real world corruption is often highly organized. 
Grease money 
The final form of corruption analyzed in this section is “Grease money” which is a case of 
non-theft, passive corruption. Aidt (2003) outlines the framework in form of an agency 
model that focuses explicitly on probabilities as determinants of corruption. As an example 
case he used a tax official that firms could bribe in order to conceal their profits and avoid 
taxes. This still constitutes as non-theft since the official is not stealing any active assets of 
the government, but merely “helps with the paperwork” so to speak. 
In its simplicity, the model focuses on the corrupt official and states his decision to accept a 
bribe as: 
(1-p)b + p(w0 – w – f) > 0 
Where p is the probability of being caught, b size of the bribe, w0 wage he could earn in 
private sector after being caught, w current wage and f the aggregated cost of penalty if 
caught. If the expected value is positive, the bribe is accepted. 
This implies that corruption depends on the wage (w), quality of the monitoring system (p) 
and the cost of legal consequences (f). The most insightful part of the model is the analysis 
of wages. It is often said that corruption is the result of poor wages. Initial papers on 
corruption focused on this determinant such as Becker and Stigler (1974) who considered 
that the fundamental answer to corruption was to raise salaries above jobs the officials 
could have.  The idea is that efficiency wage deters corruption by increasing the cost of being 
caught. 
In terms of above specification, the efficiency wage that would keep all officials honest 
(excluding the effect of legal sanctions) would be: 
we = w0 + [(1-p)/p]*b  (where f = 0) 
In this case the efficiency wage is a mark-up on the private sector wage, equal to benefit of 
corruption. This shows us an important realization that viability of such efficiency wages are 
tied to efficiency of the monitoring system. It is evident that this method of reducing 
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corruption is highly expensive and what is even worse, it doesn’t universally guarantee the 
absence of corruption. Corrupt officials may demand higher bribes as a consequence to 
compensate for the costs of dismissal. Higher bribes and salaries attract more unscrupulous 
workers and may lead to more and not less corruption. 
Besley and McLaren (1993) have explored an opposite strategy of capitulation wages where 
wages are set to bare minimum such that only corrupt citizens would accept the job. This 
may maximize the total net revenue in the case of tax collection as personnel costs are low 
and revenue is collected only when corruption is discovered. Empirical evidence shows that 
public officials in many developing countries with high corruption are paid extremely low 
capitulation wages (Klitgaard, 2007). While this is not an ideal solution, it is more reliable 
than the case of efficiency wage. 
The purpose of this section was to discuss the relevant results of popular economic 
analytical approaches to corruption. To summarize the main outcomes of the models 
discussed: 
 Corruption is very difficult to root out entirely and doing so may not be the most 
optimal outcome in terms of public benefit. 
 Corruption can be controlled as it does respond to economic incentives. 
 Ill designed legal penalties can encourage rather than discourage corruption. 
Specifically if the expected punishment function is concave with regard to the size of 
the bribe. e.g.: can lead to huge bribes that act as an entry deterrent thus facilitating 
monopolies. 
1.5. Anticorruption policies 
 
The ultimate purpose of corruption research is to eventually come up with reliable and 
efficient anti-corruption policies to curb corruption and thus increase public welfare. With 
the rising awareness of corruption and its consequences many governments and 
organizations have undertaken a major effort to create and implement anti-corruption 
policies (Mungiu-Pippidi 2006). For the past 15 years the majority of countries ridden with 
widespread corruption have initiated numerous anticorruption policies with the support of 
international community. Unfortunately most if not all anti-corruption policies have 
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provided mixed results with varying success depending on the setting (Hollyer 2012). In 
worst cases, misguided anti-corruption policies have backfired and actually increased 
corruption rather than decreasing it (Persson, Rothstein & Teorell 2012). As such, 
economists today have no reliable universal anticorruption guidelines. A general 
recommendation is to tackle corruption on a case by case basis. However what’s even more 
troubling is that current empirical economic literature is ill-suited to suggest which form in 
particular a given policy maker should choose (Hollyer 2012).  
Much of the previous and existing guidance was based on theoretical works that modeled 
corruption on the assumption of a set of rational preferences. This lead to many 
international anti-corruption guidelines suffering from theoretical mischaracterization of the 
problem of systemic corruption (Persson, Rothstein & Teorell 2012). 
One of the most important assumptions of most anticorruption policies is the existence of a 
benevolent non-corruptible principal. This assumption is crucial for many anticorruption 
policies to work. Persson, Rothstein & Teorell (2012) frame corruption as a collective action 
problem which is dependent on the state of society and expected actions of others than just 
those of the individual. Thus corruption under these circumstances is not solvable from the 
ground level. Persson, Rothstein & Teorell (2012) come to the conclusion that such 
corruption requires either a big economy wide push that believably affects the expectations 
of others’ actions or high level political will. Unfortunately corruption benefits increase with 
power. A high level principal is needed, but at the same time he has the highest incentives to 
engage in corruption. 
It is important to note that even in theoretical work based on rational expectations 
corruption is rarely eliminated entirely, but instead managed and diminished. Eliminating it 
entirely is often either impossible or too expensive resulting in even lower public benefit. 
Many anti-corruption practices that work great in theory can have surprising and opposite 
results in practice due to unexpected mechanics revealed in experimental studies. These 





Mechanics of anticorruption 
The mechanisms that anti-corruption policies use is altering of the incentives under which 
corrupt or potentially corrupt officials base their decisions on. There are two ways these 
policies can be implemented: A Top-down and a Bottom-up approach. In a Top-down 
approach, the anti-corruption responsibility is put on a government official to audit and 
sanction a government agency. In a Bottom-up approach the hopes are placed on the 
consumer by empowering them through better access to information or a reporting 
mechanism of corruption.  (Hollyer 2012)  
Bottom-up approach has been experimented with in countries with high levels of corruption. 
As any government initiative is most likely to become corrupt, the citizens who receive no 
benefit from corruption can be a reliable mechanism of oversight. The Bottom-up approach 
works best in situations where the citizens are in close contact with officials and their 
services thus being able to observe corruption most effectively. Additionally knowledge of 
the government function at hand and costs associated is important. Olken (2007) found in a 
road building experiment in India that villagers were quite accurate at detecting inflated 
prices in a road project, but not inflated quantities. Thus Bottom-up approach is reliant on 
how observable the work of an official is and how well-informed the citizens are. 
The Top-down approach comes often more naturally as a solution as it seems logical that the 
government who is in charge of regulating everything else would also have the responsibility 
of ensuring its employees conduct themselves honestly. The main mechanics through which 
Top-Down approach works is audit and power of sanction. On the first sight, there are 
several advantages to a government oversight of its own agencies. The auditors are 
professionals and specifically funded for this particular purpose. Secondly, they can directly 
affect the expected utilities of the officials and agents through sanctions that make them a 
very credible threat to corrupt parties. However, Top-down approach suffers from all the 
main dilemmas of anticorruption; Transference, Red tape and Capture.  
Dilemmas of anticorruption policymaking 
Some policies have shifted the balance of the corruption process in a way that has 
encouraged corruption instead of stemming it. Many anti-corruption policies have 
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unexpected results because mechanics of the corruption are poorly known and lack 
empirical study. Theoretical examination goes only so far as there are valid assumptions, but 
if we don’t know what the assumption should be, any theoretical discussion will be moot.  
Anticorruption policy thus faces challenges that need to be addressed for the policy to work 
as intended. I have identified three major recurring dilemmas based on corruption literature 
that have plagued anticorruption policies. They are Transference, Red tape and Capture. 
Transference refers to simply transferring the benefits of the corruption from one official to 
another. The most straightforward issue with any anticorruption measure is that they rarely 
eliminate the problem, but merely shift the corruption elsewhere or spread it around. For 
example the creation of a special watchdog organization to oversee the conduct of corrupt 
officials will shift the bribe benefits from officials to the oversight officials. Tougher 
punishments for corruption lead to higher incentives for judges and prosecutors to engage in 
corruption because corrupt officials are now more motivated to bribe them. Since the end of 
Soviet Union, Russian tax agency was regarded as highly corrupt which led to the creation of 
special tax policy to prosecute tax evaders. Immediately since its creation the tax policy unit 
became one of the most corrupt agencies in Russia since tax evasion was rampant and highly 
lucrative (Levin & Satarov 1999). As can be seen here, the problem of corruption remains 
unsolved. If the government is unable to prevent corruption in one department then why 
should we expect that another will remain corruption free? Addressing Transference is a 
difficult, but necessary requirement for any anticorruption policy. 
Red tape is another phenomenon that perverts anticorruption policies into corruption 
enhancing. Anticorruption measures can lead to official process become more cumbersome 
for the private sector and thus incentivize payments of grease money. Red tape is a 
significant threat where the corruption is passive and instigated by the private sector. In 
Russia and Eastern Europe traffic police has been one of the most corrupt government 
agencies where people go to work for bribes only (Börzel & Pamuk 2011). An example of red 
tape causing an anticorruption measure to backfire is when the Russian government 
reduced the amount of fines a traffic policeman could charge on the spot. Fines in Russia 
had to be paid on the spot or else your driver’s license would be confiscated until the fines 
were paid. The bureaucracy of the latter option would usually take a full day to accomplish. 
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With lowering the maximum amount of fines the traffic policemen were forced to confiscate 
the driver’s license for much lesser violations. This led to people being more eager than ever 
to bribe the traffic police in order to avoid wasting a full day running around government 
agencies in order to pay the fine. The new law discouraged people from upholding the law 
and in fact strengthened the corrupt policemen’s leverage in the bribe negotiation.  
Capture means a risk of government officials twisting an anticorruption policy to further 
their own ends. Officials in charge of oversight are thus “captured” by corrupt officials 
(Hollyer 2012). While this is an issue mostly for high level corruption, it has been highly 
prevalent in the fight against corruption in Southern Caucasus. Börzel & Pamuk (2011) 
describe how incumbent regimes of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan had implemented 
anticorruption policies to cut the power resources of their political opponents. Another 
example of capture is monopolizing of corruption. If corruption of a government service is 
prevalent and spread over several organizations the power can be misguidedly concentrated 
in the hands of a single organization through an anticorruption policy. This in turn allows it 
to set monopoly bribe-levels; Aidt (2003) provides an industrial organization analysis of such 
a case. The result is that corruption is nominally decreased, but public welfare is worse as 
bribes are no longer competitive. 
Behavioral economics have changed economists’ views of an agent. Agents are not driven by 
cold rational self-utility maximizing calculus, but also have social motives. The preference 
function assumed to govern the agents’ decision making is much more complex than 
previously assumed and includes peculiarities like inequality aversion, moral costs and 
reciprocity invoking reference points. They are affected by ethical considerations and 
intrinsic motivations. Experimental studies of corruption have shown that this paradigmatic 
shift is highly relevant and can provide the missing link in explaining the true decision 
process of corruption. It can provide answers to questions such as why some corrupt acts 
are enforced by the power of reciprocity or why some officials forgo their narrow self-
interest and serve the public instead. (Lambsdorff 2012) 
Lambsdorff (2012) has written about a number of other anti-corruption policy examples that 
were based on sound argumentation and logical assumption, that fell short. Keeping to the 
mathematical principle of OLS regression, having too few explanatory variables can lead to a 
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breakdown of the model. An example of sound argumentation coupled with lack of empirical 
understanding is the four-eyes principle. The four-eyes principle is based on a rather 
straightforward, but highly plausible assumption that two people getting corrupted is less 
likely than one person. If we assume that an official is corrupt with some probability p, then 
it follows that the probability that two officials being corrupt is p2 which is less than p (0 > p 
> 1). Two auditors becoming both corrupt are less likely a probability than just one auditor 
becoming corrupt and if one auditor remains honest, no corruption can take place.   
This principle is most commonly utilized through peer review that is a standard 
organizational method. However, Schikora (2010) provides experimental evidence that 
groups are more self-seeking than individuals and are better at cultivating reputation for a 
reliable reciprocity thus making the policy backfire. It appears that groups can have entirely 
different utility functions than individuals. Studies by Cain, Loewenstein and Moore (2005) 
show however that four-eyes principle in fact increases the probability of corruption rather 
than decreasing it as people are bolder and suffer less from moral costs in a group than 
when working alone. They also get reinforcement from the group by shifting responsibility of 
the act to the other members believing that it must be alright if another person approves it 
too. This means that their moral cost functions are not static and change with the number of 
other auditors on the case. This is hardly foreseeable with theoretical analysis and serves as 
an excellent example to merit the use of experimental research.    
Another long held truth in anti-corruption policies is transparency which is believed to 
universally decrease corruption. After all, perhaps the most prominent anti-corruption 
agency in the world is called Transparency International. Yet experimental studies show that 
transparency can cause moral licensing in agents as well as impair judgment of the informed.  
Loewenstein, Cain & Sah (2011) report of an experiment involving a large jar of marbles. 
Participants had to estimate the number of marbles, but were also provided with an advisor 
who possessed more detailed information regarding the quantity of the marbles. While the 
estimator’s payoff depended on the accuracy of the estimate, the advisor’s payoff depended 
on how much the estimator overestimated the quantity. In addition to the control group, 
two treatments were made. One where the advisors had to disclose this conflict of interest 
and another where they kept it secret. The results were shocking, people in the group 
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without disclosure made much better estimates than those who knew the advisors were 
biased. Additionally, advisors who disclosed information behaved more unscrupulously than 
those that didn’t by giving worse advice.  
Similar “transparency errors” can be observed in recent history. A top-down approach to 
transparency in the form of auditing can create financial incentives to auditors that were at 
the heart of Enron and mortgage crises. The existence of auditors provided a corruption 
shield to companies and paid lip service to regulators. While transparent on the surface, the 
conflict of interest led auditors to be incapable of objective analysis of the companies’ 
finances. 
Disclosures can also be misinterpreted as a sign of honesty or professional standing by the 
recipients. At the same time those who disclose conflicts of interest receive a moral license 
and feel their burden of moral responsibility transferred. Disclosure also was found to 
increase the pressure to comply with bad advice. 
Anti-corruption policy can thus be a two edged sword. In the case of failure it may have no 
results or facilitate corruption at worst. The failures of anti-corruption policy show the 
importance of understanding correct corruption mechanics. They are not dependent solely 
on the constraints the actors face, but political institutions and culture also heavily affect the 
mechanics under which individuals operate.  
2. Research Methodology   
There are many various methods employed in the study of corruption, but not all of them 
have proven to be successful. Early corruption research was mostly theoretical focusing on 
systemic causes of corruption such as theories of individual incentives for government 
officials to engage in corruption (Sequeira 2012). During the last decades beginning from 
early 1970s various methods have been employed with varying amounts of success to 
measure and model corruption. During the last decade research methods of corruption have 
been revolutionized which is indicated by a rapid increase in corruption literature. In this 
chapter I will cover the studies of the five most used methods for the study corruption: 
Perception indices, surveys, observation, laboratory experiments and field experiments. In 
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addition I will briefly review some of the prominent corruption literature related to each 
approach. 
2.1. Perception Indices 
 
After the initial attempt of theoretical approach, the first form of empirics used in corruption 
research were surveys of perception that subsequently became quite popular. Since 
corruption was hard to observe directly, perception survey sounded like a good proxy to 
observe corruption. This methodology was quite popular in the 1990s and until quite 
recently most estimates of corruption were based on perception surveys (Olken & Pande 
2011). 
Perception surveys were sent on a country basis to a number of individuals in relevant 
positions relating to business and government such as businessmen, judges, lawyers, 
policemen and politicians. Questions were simple where the recipients had to grade various 
questions. The perception surveys focused on questions about general levels of corruption 
such as financial honesty of politicians, the likelihood of firms having to pay bribes for 
government services or about the number of elected leaders who are perceived to be 
involved in corrupt deals (Sequira 2012). The results were then aggregated and combined 
into indices that gave a single numerical measure on a country or industry basis. These 
surveys generated much needed macro-level data that could be used to measure 
corruption’s effect on important macroeconomic factors such as growth or foreign 
investment (Mauro 1995).  
Indices formed from perception surveys were used as a basis for cross-country studies of 
corruption. The two most famous indices used today are Transparency International’s 
Annual Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and World Bank’s Control of Corruption Index. 
These perception indices can be quite specific varying in different aspects and types of 
corruption ranging from grassroots to high level corruption.  
However, despite their prevalent use, the explanatory power of perception surveys came 
eventually under question. From conceptual point of view, corruption perception surveys 
tried to sum together often too many forms of corruption under a handful of indicators. 
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Secondly, corruption literature still lacked empirical evidence to back up its corruption 
related policies. (Sequeira 2012) 
In terms of methodology, challenges were even more severe in terms of sampling and 
reporting bias. Perception surveys were often sent to international businessmen considered 
experts in their field and thus most informed. However they might not be the most objective 
evaluators of corruption in given countries. Olken (2009) shows that individual 
characteristics such as education have much more power in predicting perceived corruption 
than actual corruption. Sampling bias may also occur if a firm’s business sector has a 
proclivity to engage in corrupt behavior in the first place. Sequeira (2012) names oil sector in 
Nigeria as an example of this where officials may be particularly corrupt. This results that the 
country is shown to be disproportionally corrupt based on one industry. Olken & Pande 
(2011) describe how after the fall of Indonesian dictator Soeharto in 1998 surveys reported 
that corruption had become much worse according to Transparency International Index. 
While this is entirely possible, the press became much freer to report allegations of 
corruption which it did. Therefore it cannot be excluded that perceptions of corruptions rose 
while the actual corruption fell. 
The other type of bias, reporting bias may come in two varieties. The first one being the 
“bandwagon effect” under which respondents are influenced by the commonly held 
perception in the resident country. Thus respondents are not evaluating their personal 
perception of corruption, but what is their belief of the general public’s perception of 
corruption. The other form of reporting bias known as the “halo effect” emerges when 
international experts and businessmen fall prey to prejudice where they expect poor 
countries or dysfunctional governments be more automatically more corrupt. 
Finally, the comparison of corruption perception indices across countries and time is rather 
questionable as the perception of what is corrupt varies by country and culture.  
Empirical evidence has also shown that perception surveys’ accuracy can vary highly 
depending on how the corruption is organized. Olken (2009) examined villagers’ perception 
of the level of corruption in a local road building project in India. He found that while the 
villagers’ perceptions did reflect actual corruption in the road project, the magnitude was 
quite weak. Increasing the actual missing expenditures in the road project by 10 percent led 
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only to a 0,8 percent increase to a probability that a villager reported any corruption in the 
road project. Furthermore the public perception was curiously biased on the method of 
corruption. While the villagers were good at detecting marked up prices through 
overcharging they were much less accurate at detecting inflated quantities. For example, 
billing for a 1000m3 of rocks, but supplying only 800m3. This may be the reason for the 
relatively low correlation between perceptions and actual corruption as people must make 
an inference about the aspects of corruption they cannot perceive and that’s where most 
corruption is usually hidden Olken & Pande (2011). 
While perception surveys are still popular amongst non-academic organizations such as 
Transparency International and the World Bank, they have become uncommon in academic 
literature and replaced by other methods due to their limitations in explanation of micro-
determinants of corruption or the complete set of mechanics of corruption in the economy. 
They were also unable to explain important within country variation in the incidence of 
corruption across different public services or to differentiate between different types of 
corruption (eg: grassroots vs. high level or coercive vs. collusive) as well as the range of 
behavioral responses it can induce (Sequiera 2012).  
 
2.2. Surveys 
While perception surveys measured corruption levels they did little in the way of explaining 
many different forms and methods of corruption. In response to the growing need of 
empirical research scientists began to seek new ways to gather micro-level data on 
corruption. The result was a redesign of survey questions with a focus of eliciting truthful 
reporting on actual bribe payments with intent of later applying them to a representative 
sample of agents in the economy. These surveys had standardized questions on whether 
firms or individuals had actually engaged in corruption in a specific and well defined 
situation such as obtaining a government contract, an import license or a certificate. 
Additionally they were easily replicable and thus allowed more specific and meaningful 
longitudinal and cross-sectional comparisons of corruption between countries based on a 
more representative sample of respondents. (Sequiera 2012, Olken & Pande 2011) 
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Svensson (2003) illustrates the method by using self-reported bribe payments by Ugandan 
firms to show that the incidence of corruption varied by firm characteristics even while 
corruption was considered as pervasive. It also showed a more accurate distribution of bribe 
payments across different types of agents. This is an important result as it brings us closer to 
understanding distributional costs of corruption and specific ways to target them. For 
example Mocan (2008) found that income and education of an individual had positive 
impact on the probability of being asked for a bribe in developing countries, but an opposite 
effect in developed ones. 
However, this new survey data had some challenges of its own. The quality and consistency 
of the questions played an important role in the surveys as cross-national attitudes on 
corruption still varied as before. Even with the right questions respondents may understand 
the same question differently depending on their country of residence especially with the 
fact that what constitutes as corruption was up to interpretation. What might be perceived 
as a gift in one country might be viewed as a bribe in another.  
Another challenge was the extent to which the respondent might misreport the bribe 
payments on purpose for various reasons. One being that fear or shame of exposure can 
lead to underreporting of bribes.  Attempts of strategic manipulation of results by 
misreporting can also play a role. These are known as social desirability bias where 
individuals might have a personal interest to over or under-report corruption depending on 
whether he is benefitting from it or not. Finally, imperfect recall of events also remains as a 
limitation (Rose-Ackermann 2007). 
While not really a methodological concern, but still a research limitation, the close-ended 
and few in number questions allow little room for detail on the micro-dynamics of 
corruption. This make it difficult to detect alternative forms of corruption the researchers 




2.3. Observation  
A recent, but very innovative approach to estimate corruption is estimation that can be 
conducted through direct or indirect observation. This approach has gained popularity in 
recent years and provided quite accurate and interesting results. 
Naturally the best way to measure corruption is to observe it directly in practice. While this 
is difficult it is not impossible, especially when it comes to grassroots corruption. Olken & 
Barron (2009) have managed to gather data on actual bribes to police paid by truck drivers 
on their routes in the Indonesian province of Aceh. The researchers spent over nine months 
travelling along with the drivers disguised as assistants while recording and observing the 
bribing in practice. In total they spent over 300 trips and observed more than 6000 illegal 
payments. They calculated that in aggregate these costs made up 13 percent of the marginal 
cost of the trip. A rather steep cost considering the salary of the truck driver was only 10 
percent. 
Sequeira and Djankov (2010) used a similar method by shadowing customs agents in 
Mozambique and South Africa as they processed customs for cargo. Together they observed 
bribe payments of 1300 shipments. Based on this they estimated that bribes represent 14 
percent of the shipping costs for a standard container passing through the port of Maputo, 
Mozambique and 4 percent of the shipping costs for a standard container passing through 
Durban, South Africa. 
This level of detail in the data allows researchers to identify different mechanisms of 
corruption in specific government agencies. The challenge of the method comes however in 
the form of logistics both from the side of effort and time. Additionally making these kinds of 
arrangements can be difficult and will vary from context to context depending on trust 
between the researcher and the subjects. Aside from feelings of shame or embarrassment 
subjects may also have concerns for legal repercussions. 
Indirect observation methods are essentially creative ways to detect corruption through 
identification of gaps between primary and secondary data. In this type of estimation of 
corruption by subtraction a researcher obtains two sets of measures for some quantity of 
resources which one is from before corruption occurs and the other one after. By comparing 
the measures the researcher obtains an estimate of the size of graft. An emerging subfield of 
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indirect observation called “forensic economics” applies more complex methods although in 
a similar manner. These methods seek to uncover corruption through applications of price-
theoretic models and market equilibrium conditions in order to identify patterns of 
statistical anomalies that may indicate corruption (Sequeira 2012).  
A good example of indirect observation is Reinikka and Svensson (2004) where the 
researchers used such a method to compare the amount of special education funds officially 
sent by the central government in Uganda to the one reported received by schools. They 
estimated a rate of corruption they termed as “leaking” as high as 87 percent. After 
publishing the results, the leakage rate fell to less than 20 percent. 
This also shows that this type of method can be used to both estimate the levels of 
corruption as well as test the effects of anticorruption policies. As a limitation the method is 
far from exact and relies on the quality of recordkeeping. If receiving organizations have 
poor records the money might not show up in the books even though it has been received 
(Olken & Pande 2011). Statistical inference of forensic economics may struggle to isolate 
which part of the detected deviation from equilibrium conditions can be attributed to 
corruption as well as completeness of the equilibrium model itself. 
 
2.4. Laboratory Experiments 
 
Experimental methods in the study of corruption in economic literature present a rather 
novel area of research to study the micro-determinants of corruption and effects of anti-
corruption policies. Lab experiments allow a researcher to overcome the unobservability of 
corrupt behavior while at the same time maintaining a controlled and often quite cost-
effective environment. This way formulated theories can be thus tested empirically and their 
results can facilitate formulating policy measures to counter corruption. Lab experiments 
have recently enjoyed a sharp rise in popularity which is indicated by a large number of 
papers published in the last decade (Bobkova & Egbert 2012).  
One of the very first such experiments was Frank & Schulze (1998) where the researchers 
studied individual tendencies to engage in corruption in procurement and whether 
economists are more likely to accept bribes. This study was followed in a few years by an 
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extended analysis of how intrinsic motivations are affected by threats of penalties (Schulze & 
Frank 2003).  
In economic lab experiments subjects are provided with explicit instructions which explain 
the exact consequences of their actions and that these consequences are purely monetary. 
An important aspect of all corruption experiments in economic literature is the concept of 
non-deception where the subjects are never deceived during experiments, not even 
temporarily. However this does allow certain leeway such as uncertainty or subject pool 
manipulation (Armantier & Boly 2011).  
The corruption experiments are then often subjected to various treatments to pinpoint the 
identity and magnitude of its determinants. Three common themes that have long been 
studied for their ability to promote or deter corruption have been size of the bribe (Rose-
Ackermann 1974), size of the wage (Besley & McLaren 1993) and monitoring and 
punishment (Schulze & Frank 2003).  
Laboratory experiments can answer similar questions as perception surveys, but with more 
precision in explaining the determinants of corruption between different countries. 
Armantier & Boly (2011) specify two main advantages the laboratory experimental approach 
offers in this regard: 
1. Corrupt behavior is unambiguously observed at the individual level 
2. The researcher controls both the environment and the characteristics of the subjects’ 
population 
A vast majority of the corruption lab experiments have been investigations of bribery. In 
many cases the experiment is designed in a way where a participant designated as a public 
official takes a bribe in exchange for some sort of favor (Lambsdorff & Frank 2010, Abbink, 
Irlenbusch & Renner 2002). These experiments address reciprocity and are often 
investigated in the form of a modified economic games such as ultimatum, dictator or trust 
games (Bobkova & Egbert 2012). 
The limitation of laboratory experiments is that they don’t involve explicit abuse of public 
office and it can be argued that the essence of corruption has not been captured in the lab. 
Another concern along the same lines is that lab subjects might make moral choices over 
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wealth maximizing ones due to them knowing they’re being observed (Levitt and List 2007) 
although Armantier & Boly (2011) have shown evidence that finds no significant effects from 
being observed. However, non-monetary intangible considerations such as moral, ethical or 
legal remain difficult to capture in a lab setting although not impossible as I will 
consequently attempt to demonstrate in the experiment section of this thesis. 
 
2.5. Field Experiments 
 
While most experiments on corruption have been conducted in a laboratory setting there 
have been a few experiments conducted in the field. Field experiments are essentially lab 
experiments conducted without subjects knowing they’re in an experiment, but believe that 
everything is real. Participants are usually notified of the experiment once it is over although 
this not always possible.  
Since the entire experimental method is at its infancy, the field experiments on corruption 
have been very rare as there exists only a handful of such accounts in the literature. While 
there have been conducted many pointless lab experiments with hasty planning the few 
field experiments performed have been exemplary. They are very inspiring and have lots of 
good though put into them brilliantly showcasing the potential of the approach. While I will 
briefly mention them below, I will present them in greater detail in the next chapter. 
Armantier & Boly (2011) perform a controlled field experiment on corruption where an exam 
grader is bribed for a better grade. The experiment takes place in Burkina Faso, a country 
with a serious corruption problem (Corruption Perceptions Index consistently below 5). To 
really make the research complete, they ran the same experiment under a laboratory setting 
for comparison of the results.  
Another ingenious corruption field experiment was conducted by Bertrand et al. (2006), 
where they studied obtaining drivers’ licenses in India and attempting to identify which rules 
can be broken through bribery. The researchers divided participants randomly in two groups 
in addition to the control group. First group was offered a bonus for obtaining the license 
fast while the second group was given free lessons. The results indicated that bureaucrats 
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raised red tape on purpose to extract such bribes and thus undermined the very purpose of 
regulation. 
Lastly a pioneer of corruption field experimentation Benjamin Olken, details in his Olken 
(2006) of a robust study of over 600 village road projects in India. He used independent 
engineers to estimate the cost of inputs in each road project which he then compared with 
the official village expenditure accounts. The results indicated the importance and 
effectiveness of top-down monitoring even in highly corrupt environments. 
The advantages of corruption field experiments are significant. Results are directly from real 
life and highly representative of what happens when agents engage in corruption. The 
research also doesn’t need to be constrained by hypotheses. Field experiments allow 
surprising and unforeseen mechanics to occur that are completely real and not merely 
theoretical.  
Another advantage of a field experiment is that there is no contamination of the subject 
pool from deception since subjects are not away of the experiment in the first place. This is 
an important fact as some deception is practically mandatory in case of corruption research 
due its illegal and immoral nature. Obviously any part where researchers are involved and 
identified as researchers must remain deception free.  
However as a counterweight to its benefits designing field experiments has the most 
challenges of all approaches. While producing the purest and more realistic data, the field 
experiments are logistically heavy and difficult to control. However this too can be overcome 
with proper experiment planning as the literature has shown. As more researchers adopt 
this approach the additional thought being put into it will undoubtedly come up with clever 
ways to conduct corruption field experiments. 
3. Literature Review 
 
In this chapter I will review the extant literature on experimental study of bribery under 
laboratory and field settings. During the past decade there has been a veritable boom in 
experimental study of bribery under lab setting. While field experiments have been few in 
number, interest in them is growing rapidly (Sequeira 2012). Laboratory experiments 
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particularly have become quite popular only in recent years with the rise of neuroeconomics 
and other adoptions of interdisciplinary methods by visionary economists. Lab experiments 
consist of running various sorts of psychological games, very similar to those in behavioral 
economics. These games usually test some form of theory or try to create data that would 
shed light on the mechanics of corruption and moral choice of individuals. One of the main 
lines of study of experiments is a bribery situation that will be the focus of this literature 
review. In bribery situations the subject that represents a public official either by 
imagination (lab) or proxy (field) takes a bribe from an individual in exchange for a favor at 
public’s expense (Bobkova & Egbert 2012). 
Despite of the high promise of the method, the experimental literature on corruption is still 
in its infancy. The major weak point of the method, external validity also remains partially 
open as it is not yet clear how generalizable the results of experimental studies are. However, 
List (2006) shows that representativeness of the environment, rather than representative of 
the sampled population, is the most crucial variable in determining generalizability of results 
for a large class of experimental laboratory games. This is an important insight because 
constant environment and highly representative sample population cannot be both had in 
any other study aside from a very large scale field experiment.  
The inherent difference between lab and field studies is that the subjects are aware of being 
observed in the lab, but not in the field. This scrutiny can have significant impact on the 
subjects’ behavior as lab subjects may be more inclined to make “moral choices” when 
wealth and morality are competing objectives as is often the case with corruption (Levitt & 
List 2007). This effect can be very significant as moral, ethical and legal reasons serve often 
as major deterrents of corruption (Armantier & Boly 2010). Secondly, in most corruption 
situations there is a framing effect where the participants frame the interaction in a way 
other than immoral corruption, but as a gift exchange, a business transaction or as some 
other seemingly legitimate affair. This can also make observing corruption more difficult in 
the lab as corruption is usually disguised under a veil of legitimacy that is harder to achieve 
under sterile lab conditions. 
With the failures of anticorruption measures in developing countries the universal validity of 
corrupt behavior has been questioned (Hollyer 2012). The empirical literature in 
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development economics has provided many studies that clearly establish that corruption 
may vary across countries and cultures based on many attributes such as education, religion, 
ethnicity or language heterogeneity (Armantier & Boly 2010). However, these studies do not 
tell if corruption between countries has the same determinants and responds to the same 
factors. This brings forth a question of location for experiments as while most corruption 
happens in undeveloped countries, much of the lab experimentation is conducted in 
developed countries. 
3.1. Laboratory experiments 
 
In general bribery lab studies consist of subjects playing either the role of a private agent or 
a public official. Games are run either as one-shot or multiple-round although one-shot 
games are much more common. The focus of study is usually the decisions individuals take 
to bribe as well as reciprocate in the role of public officials. In addition to this, experiments 
are often subjected to various treatments in order to explore how the results change and 
estimate the significance of assumed corruption determinants.  
The purpose of alternate treatments is mainly to measure the effectiveness of deterrents 
with the intent of finding out which determinant would be most effective in curbing 
corruption. But treatments can have other meanings too; they can serve to bring more 
realism in the experiment as is the case with externalities or play down the sterility of the lab 
such as when instructions are framed in an abstract/neutral way. 
While experiments begun as a study of general levels of bribery they were quickly followed 
up by various treatments focusing on certain determinants. These determinants can be 
roughly divided into three categories: Tangible, Intangible and Intermediary. Tangible 
determinants are those that directly affect the payoffs and can thus be precisely measured 
and quantified such as wages, fines or externalities – monetary costs to third parties.  
Intangible determinants on the other hand affect such costs and benefits that are highly 
individualistic and difficult to predict such as moral or social costs or framing effects. Since 
they are a definite missing link from theoretical work, experimental study has made many 
interesting findings in this area. Lastly, the method of bribery has also been studied in the 
form of intermediaries. The role and effect of intermediaries have been recorded to 
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significantly increase the efficacy of bribery which is supported by empirical evidence as a 
huge and prosperous lobbying industry in both the U.S. and the EU.  
Bribery 
The first economic corruption experiment ever recorded was conducted by Frank and 
Schulze (2000). This was a relatively straightforward experiment of bribery in general and 
focused entirely on the behavior of public officials. Bribe paying private firms were made up 
and simulated by the experimenters. The role of the principal was given to a local self-
financing student film club which served as a realistic passive victim of corruption. The 
experiment was conducted during one of the movie showings before which moviegoers 
were asked to make a decision on behalf of the movie club. A 200DM (~102€) bank note 
owned by the film club had fallen into a drainpipe and could only be retrieved by a plumbing 
company. Ten companies had submitted their offers that consisted of two sums. The first 
sum was the price to the movie club while the second was the amount of money the 
company would pay the decision maker for getting the deal. Prices were positively linked 
with the bribes ranging from 20 DM (at bribe = 0) to 200 DM (with 144DM bribe and zero 
rent to the movie club). Additionally it was credibly announced that the movie club would 
receive all rents as well as two randomly chosen subjects would get their bribes. They found 
that economics students, especially males, were significantly more corrupt than students of 
other subjects. In the second treatment the experimenters examined whether participants 
would be less inclined to act corruptly if awarded independently of the bribe a lump sum 
payment for participation in the experiment. This treatment had no effect on the outcome. 
Since Frank and Schulze (2000) several experiments have been run to target specifically the 
impact of tangible determinants of corruption such as risk of punishment, effect of wages 
and externalities. Following their 2000 experiment Schulze and Frank (2003) extended their 
experiment to include a detection mechanism. This probability of detection increased with 
the size of the bribe accepted. In case of detection the bribe as well as the lump sum 
“participation fee” was forfeit. The results were astounding, introduction of detection 
mechanism significantly reduced number of honest actions to the point of marginality. In the 
no risk treatment 9,4% accepted the zero bribe offer, but with monitoring this figure became 
0,9%. This finding was in accordance with the notion of intrinsic motivation being crowded 
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out by monetary rewards or monitoring by the principal. However monitoring did have some 
impact in the sense that it significantly reduced the average size of the bribe due to it 
increasing the chance of detection. 
Abbink et al. (2002) were the first to design a bribery experiment with treatments to 
measure the influence of punishment and negative external effects. This experiment had a 
deep impact on the literature and has been replicated and modified in many ways since then.  
Drawing on Frank and Schulze (2000) Abbink et al. (2002) expanded the experiment to 
include the role of the private agents for participants. The experiment begins with a pure 
reciprocity treatment that examined pairs of players where a firm has an option to offer a 
bribe to an official. In return it has to pay a relatively low transfer fee. If the bribe is rejected, 
both parties receive their initial endowments minus the transfer fee for the firm. If the 
official accepts the bribe, the payoffs of both parties are significantly increased. In the 
second stage of the game the official can choose among two options where the first results 
in equal gains for both parties while the other significantly increases the payoffs of the 
briber while slightly decreasing the payoff of the official. It is worthy to note that this game is 
run as multiple-round game and the first treatment studies reciprocity and trust only. This is 
contrasted to a game theoretic prediction where the unique subgame perfect Nash-
equilibrium predicts that bribery should never occur since the official should never 
reciprocate.  
In the second treatment a negative externality is added in the form of a penalty to other 
groups in the experiment. Reciprocating the bribe will cause a monetary damage to all other 
participants in the experiment. Due to these damages reciprocating is inefficient in terms of 
total payoffs for all players as total damages exceed the mutual gains realized by the corrupt 
pair. No feedback is provided to any of the players during the game or between rounds 
regarding their own or others’ payoffs. Abbink et al. (2002) found that this negative 
externality had virtually no effect on the choices of players, possible due to the fact that 
other groups were in an equal position to cause the same negative externality to them.  
The third and final treatment introduces a danger of being caught. The risk however is so 
low (0,3%) that only very risk-averse subjects would refrain from corruption for this reason 
alone. The risk-lottery is run in case the bribe is accepted and does not depend whether the 
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bribe is reciprocated or not. In case of getting caught, the event is treated as a sudden death 
causing both players of the pair to lose all their earnings and be barred from playing the 
game any further. The game is played 30 rounds so the maximum probability of getting 
caught by accepting a bribe every round is p = 1 – (1-θ)30 = 0,086 = 8,6%, where θ = 0,003 is 
the chance of being detected. Chance of a drastic penalty was found to significantly decrease 
the acceptance rates of bribes as well as frequency of reciprocation.  
Framing 
In Abbink & Henning-Schmidt (2006) the authors add a framing treatment to the game 
played in Abbink et al. (2002). The authors investigate whether suggestive phrasing as 
compared to a neutrally framed abstract wording can produce differing results. The 
hypothesis here is that due to corruption having a negative connotation it could play an 
effect on individuals’ decisions. This treatment however brought not significant effects in 
risky or risk-free games. There was no significant difference in the level of bribes or the 
frequency of permissions given by the public officials.  
A much talked paper of Lambsdorff & Frank (2010) produces similar results in the 
experiment that examines whether there is a difference if players frame their bribe payment 
as a gift or a bribe. The authors find only very marginal difference between the choice of 
words although calling the bribe a bribe does elicit reciprocation slightly more consistently. 
This game is also played in pairs and in three stages where in the first stage the firm decides 
whether to pay a bribe and if so whether to call it a gift or a bribe. In the second stage the 
official decides whether to report the bribe, accept and reciprocate or accept and betray. 
There appears to be no option of simply rejecting it. Additionally there’s a third and last 
round of the game where the bribing firm may choose to whistle blow on the official at an 
additional cost. Personally I find this experiment somewhat flawed as the choice of words 
was meant to have no effect on the outcomes. In the real world bribes are called gifts 
because it is believed to provide some form of protection in case of detection. In this case it 
had semantic meaning only and the results were according. There was virtually no difference 
between opportunism (58% vs 59%) and whistle blowing (29% vs 27%) between the gifts and 
bribes respectively. Reciprocation was 13% when bribe was called a gift and 16% when it 
was called a bribe.  
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Armantier & Boly (2010) run an innovative bribery experiment in both lab and field settings. 
While the purpose of the study is to investigate external validity of a lab experiment it still 
serves as a fine example of a bribery experiment conducted under lab setting. To measure 
the external validity the experiment was conducted in both a developed (Montreal, Canada) 
and an undeveloped (Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso) country. In the lab experiment players 
were divided in two groups. The first group had to write a dictation and their payoff 
depended negatively on the number of mistakes they make. These players had an option to 
bribe the other group of players who were correcting their dictation to overlook some 
mistakes. Failed papers received zero payoffs. Each grader had exactly 20 papers to grade 
and each stack of 20 papers contained one paper with a bribe as 11th paper. It is also 
interesting to note that players writing the dictations were real students while the graders 
were real teachers hired through a recruiting company complete with strict academic 
requirements. As a result it was surprising to find in the pure reciprocity, no-risk control 
treatment 50% of Ouagadougou teachers rejected the bribe, but in Montreal only a third.  
In addition to the experiment described above, three treatments targeting tangible 
determinants were applied: a high wage, a high bribe and monitoring. The high wage 
treatment was identical to that of the control treatment except wages were 40% higher. The 
teachers in the experiment were all paid the market wage for their time so this was on top 
of that. This reduced bribe taking acceptance in both locations by roughly 35%. In the high 
bribe treatment the size of the bribe was doubled. This led to an increase of bribe 
acceptance in Ouagadougou, but had virtually zero effect on Montreal. The monitoring 
introduced a risk of detection by experimenters. Five randomly chosen exams of the graders 
were re-graded and if there were grading mistakes the graders were punished according to 
their amount of mistakes, but only the worst of these five papers was considered for this 
penalty. Once again this diminished bribe acceptance in Ouagadougou by roughly 20%, but 
had no effect on Montreal.  
Following the experiments of Abbink et al. (2002) and Alatas et al. (2009), Rivas (2012) ran 
experiments with a focus on investigating gender effects in corruption. The experiment was 
modeled according to pure reciprocity game of Abbink et al. (2002) and put through four 
treatments: Two treatments where both roles were filled by the same gender and two 
treatments where the genders were opposite with only the role varying. Rivas (2012) 
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concluded that gender had no significant statistical effect on the probability of offering a 
bribe except that women tended to offer lower bribes on average than men. At the same 
time, women also tended to accept bribes less frequently especially if the briber was 
another woman. They were also less likely to reciprocate after accepting the bribe compared 
to men. Based on these results Rivas (2012) concludes that men are more corrupt than 
women and postulates that increasing the number of women in positions of high corruption 
could lower the levels of corruption. 
Tangible Determinants 
Risk 
Schikora (2010) produces experiments focused specifically on the study of the effects from 
various methods of detection. He studies three very popular methods of monitoring 
corruption: The four-eyes principle, Whistle-blowing and asymmetric design of sanctions. All 
games were played as multiple-round games. The results are quite interesting, the four-eyes 
principle as previously mentioned failed to deter corruption and in fact increased it in 
comparison to a single official treatment. Schikora (2010) traces this to the fact that groups 
are often more self-seeking than individuals and better at cultivating reputation for 
reciprocity. Whistle-blowing treatments with leniency to whistle-blowers backfired as well. 
Whistle-blowing generally happens only when bribe takers cheat and ends up serving as a 
tool for enforcement for corrupt transactions resulting in bribe takers not daring to cheat. 
This leads to more successful corrupt transactions and increased reciprocation by officials 
thus stabilizing corruption. Officials also refuse bribes unless they have intent to deliver. The 
last treatment is an innovative idea that uses the results of whistle-blowing treatment and 
attempts to create opposite results; destabilize corruption by increasing mistrust between 
corrupt parties. This is achieved by actually helping one party to cheat the other by 
asymmetric design of sanctions. These sanctions give great leniency to a cheating bureaucrat 
who blows the whistle as well as allow him to keep the bribe. This resulted in a significant 
decrease of corruption and bribes were rarely reciprocated, but often accepted and 
reported. These results provide an innovative approach to tackling corruption by targeting 





Barr & Serra (2009) investigate the effects of externalities in corruption as a one-shot 
ultimatum game of three players; one official, one firm and one as a member of society 
whose payoff is affected by corruption. They find that externalities do decrease bribe 
acceptance if externalities are comparatively high to the gain. The authors hypothesize that 
this may be attributed to the inequality aversion of the players. Barr & Serra (2009) also try 
different framings in instructions, but find no significant differences. Barr & Serra extend this 
experiment in Barr & Serra (2010) to study cultural effects on corruption. They compare 
British students’ choices to those of a mixed group of students from countries rated poorly 
on Transparency International’s corruption index. They find that first year British students 
engage in corruption significantly less than those coming from countries with high 
corruption. However these results do not hold for graduate students indicating that 
immigrants tend to conform to cultural norms of the resident country. 
Culture and Environment 
Continuing with cultural research Cameron et al. (2009) run the same game as Barr & Serra 
(2009) with the exception that the third player whose payoffs diminish because of 
corruption has an option to punish corrupt players at a further cost to himself. Cameron et al. 
(2009) investigate the effects of cultural differences on individual decision making of four 
countries: Australia, India, Indonesia and Singapore. Australia and Singapore count on 
Transparency International’s Corrupt Perception Index (CPI) amongst the least corrupt 
countries in the world whereas opposite applies to India and Indonesia. The aim of the 
experiment is to test whether a corrupt environment promotes corruption by lowering 
inhibition threshold and on the other hand whether this creates tolerance for corruption and 
thus lowers propensity to punish corrupt behavior. They play two treatments where one has 
welfare reducing corruption while the other has welfare enhancing corruption. 
The authors find significant cross-country differences. Indians, as compared to Australians, 
have a lower propensity to punish and are more willing to accept bribes. This does not 
transfer to Indonesians however who have significantly lower tolerance to corruption 
despite ranking poorly on corruption index. Singaporeans exhibited very similar behavior to 
Indians being eager to engage in corruption and disinclined to punish for it.  Cameron et al. 
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(2009) argue that institutional and historical framework of corruption in the countries has a 
considerable effect on individual decision making and that it may be the reason why CPI is 
unable to capture all relevant factors. 
Wages 
Jacquemet (2007) investigates the effects of a higher wage on an agent’s willingness to 
accept a bribe in a three player game. Agents that accept bribes are essentially in a conflict 
of interest in terms of reciprocity as they are confronted by two parties that request 
reciprocity. A decision needs to be made as to whom they owe their allegiance. With higher 
wages from the principal, some agents reject bribes more often. An interesting caveat here 
is that high-wages seem to polarize agents. While some agents reject bribes altogether, 
those that do accept them reciprocate much more often to the briber. Curiously income of 
the agents seemed to have no effect on corruption which means that richer agents are not 
more honest as is commonly believed. Jacquemet (2007) underlines that in order for higher 
wages to have their desired effect, the increased income must be seen specifically coming 
from the principal rather than nature (eg: scheduled pay raises, union contracts etc..) 
Intangible Determinants 
Trust 
Intangible determinants have been found to produce more significant results than tangible 
ones. Trust and respect govern our everyday interaction to a great degree and it is no less 
important a factor in corruption mechanics. Azfar & Nelson (2007) conducted an experiment 
where they formed groups of eight students in which one was appointed as the monitor. In 
the first treatment this student was randomly determined, but in the second he was 
appointed by a vote. The result was that the elected monitor was observed to be 
significantly more vigilant and devoted more resources to uncovering executives’ 
malfeasance than unelected one.  Azfar & Nelson (2007) conclude that election created 
bonds of reciprocity and cultivated a desire to serve the electorate. 
Falk & Cosfeld (2006) run a similar experiment regarding the effects of trust. In a very simple 
two player game of principal and an agent, the agent has a set of choices xi from which he 
can choose with the lowest being xL = 0. The higher the x, the higher the cost for the agent. 
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At the first stage of the game, the principals can either restrict the agent’s choice set by 
eliminating some low value choices for the principal or they may leave the choice set 
unrestricted. The control does not come for free however and the principal incurs a cost for 
it. Falk & Cosfeld (2006) find that when control is exercised agents usually select the lowest 
allowable x in the choice set. This means that if there are agents who are intrinsically 
motivated to perform in the principal's interest, controlling may actually decrease 
performance. A potential reason is that agents do not like to be restricted and perceive 
control as a negative signal of distrust. In addition, these agents might also assume that the 
principal has low expectations of them.  
Subject Pool effects 
Alatas et al. (2009) conduct an experiment studying the difference in subject pools of 
experiments by running a three player one-shot bribery game as in Barr & Serra (2009). 
Subjects are drawn from two different pools, students and public servants. The test is 
conducted in Indonesia that ranks as one of the most corrupt countries in the world. Results 
show that students in the role of a firm are much more likely to engage in corruption than 
public servants in the same role. Students appear also more corrupt in the role of a public 
official. No differences are captured in punishment frequency between the two pools. The 
authors also study, but do not find self-selection effects, students that plan to become public 
servants are statistically no more corrupt than those aiming for private sector. 
Intermediary 
Lately the methods of corruption have garnered interest in experimental literature. The use 
of delegation has posed another challenge to the rationality of our moral calculus. Action 
incurs immediate moral costs that are known to be attenuated when the same 
consequences result from inaction (Lambsdorff 2012). This translates to lighter moral 
burden if the misdeed is committed by a third party. Hamman, Loewenstein and Weber 
(2010) study the use of intermediaries in a dictator game where dictators had to delegate 
the decision making to a third party. However, before choosing a delegate, the dictator was 
informed of the decisions delegates would make in advance. This resulted to almost zero 
payoffs of recipients when delegates were used. The authors suggest that distancing 
themselves from the process through an intermediary distorted the norms of fairness of the 
56 
 
dictators. Coffman (2011) introduces a fourth player into the game who has the power to 
punish unfair dictators. He finds that dictators are punished more leniently when they 
involve an intermediary than compared to the control group without intermediaries. 
Drugov, Hamman and Serra (2011) replicated Coffman’s four-player game without 
punishment and studied the levels of bribery with and without intermediaries. They found 
that officials accepted bribes more often and of smaller size with an intermediary and firms 
demonstrated higher willingness to bribe if an intermediary was available. These results 
suggest that intermediaries may enhance corruption by reducing the moral costs of bribery. 
 
3.2. Field experiments 
 
The major difference between field and lab is the fact that subjects are not aware of being 
observed in the field. This guarantees 100% natural data and facilitates the existence of costs 
that are extremely difficult to create under lab setting such as legal or moral costs. 
Additionally field experiments are not hindered by rules regarding deception in economic 
experiments since subjects are not away of being in an economic experiment and thus there 
is no contamination of subject pool. Despite these advantages, field experiments have so far 
been few and far between. They are often costly to run and difficult to control not to 
mention the requirement of very creative thinking because of corruption’s sensitive and 
illegal nature.  Due to the high cost, all of them so far have been held in developing countries.  
To this day there have been very few field experiments on corruption in economic literature. 
I was able to find only four in total and one of them was more of an accident than a planned 
experiment.  
While not technically an experiment the results analyzed in McMillan & Zoido (2004) might 
have as well come from a perfect economic field experiment. McMillan & Zoido (2004) study 
the detailed records of Vladimiro Montesinos Torres, the chief of secret-police of President 
Alberto Fujimori, a Peruvian president in 1990s. During the course of his career Montesinos 
systematically bribed judges, politicians and the news media. But unlike most bribers, 
Montesinos kept meticulous records of all transactions requiring people to sign contracts 
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that detailed their obligations to him and going even so far as to record corrupt transactions 
on video. These records allowed economists to study the dynamics, breakdown and size of 
bribes to various entities. McMillan & Zoido (2004) used these records to estimate the cost 
of bribing various types of public officials.  
Bribes were paid from a special secret government fund that was mainly funded solely by 
three sources; ministry of the interior, ministry of defense and Peruvian army. From this 
fund the average monthly bribes paid to ordinary judges were around $3000 while superior 
court judges and judges of national elections board were paid around $50 000. Politicians 
received a monthly payment of $20 000, but the payment to large new media averaged 
$1 500 000 being the most valuable tool of power by revealed preference. All the large news 
Medias were paid off with only smaller news outlets remaining independent, fact that 
ultimately proved Montesino’s undoing. This reflects the power of mass media in the 
modern world and provides food for thought as to how it could be harnessed to fight 
corruption.  
Perhaps the first planned economic field corruption experiment was conducted by a 
pioneering economist Benjamin Olken who has conducted several studies of real life 
corruption during the last decade and spearheaded new methodologies in corruption 
research. 
Olken (2007) studies data in over 600 rural road projects of Indonesia. He goes about this 
very meticulously by comparing the official records of money spent on the road with an 
independent engineering estimate of what the road actually cost to build. To increase the 
accuracy of the estimate he had engineers dig core samples of the road to make reliable 
estimates of materials quantities, survey prices to estimate the local price level and 
interview villagers to estimate exact wages paid. Even after all this there remained the fact 
that some materials naturally disappear during construction so to make his estimate 
complete Olken built several small “test roads” to calibrate the metric under zero-corruption 
conditions. This allowed Olken to estimate the “missing expenditures” of 24% between the 
official figure and actual cost of the road. He also examined the efficacies of top-down and 
bottom-up monitoring of corruption. He found that increasing the probability of government 
audit from 4% to 100% lowered the amount of missing expenditures by 8% that was more 
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than enough to cover the costs of the audit indicating that top-down monitoring can be 
efficient even in highly corrupt environments. Increasing grassroots monitoring as a bottom-
up monitoring measure proved inefficient on average and decreased corruption only in 
situations with limited free-rider problems and elite capture.  
A study by Bertrand et al. (2007) was perhaps the most straightforward application of a lab 
experiment in a field setting. In the experiment the researchers study the corruptibility of 
driving test officials in India as well as the ease of obtaining a driver’s license this way. It is 
interesting to note that while this is a field experiment, subjects are aware of being in an 
experiment although not the purpose of the experiment and subsequent corruption is still as 
real as it gets.  
The subjects of the experiment were randomly assigned into one of three groups; control, 
bonus and lesson. The control group subjects were simply tracked through the process and 
received a payoff after a fixed time period for showing up for an interview. Bonus group 
subjects received the same treatment as control group except with an added bonus of five 
times the normal payoff if they manage to obtain their driver’s license in minimum time 
possible plus two days. The minimum time to obtain a driver’s license in India is 30 days so 
the time limit for the bonus group was 32 days. Lastly, the lesson group also received the 
same treatment as control group except they were given 15 hours of free lessons from 
certified driving schools. After obtaining their license all subjects were invited to a final 
interview to receive their payments as well as go through a surprise driving test. The 
researchers found that both bonus and lesson groups were much more likely to obtain their 
driver’s license than the control group. Alas, the surprise driving test revealed that most 
members of the bonus group were unsafe drivers. The subjects were very open to talk about 
corrupt practices and readily admitted using bribery to obtain their licenses with bonus 
group subjects being the most inclined. Interesting mechanics were also revealed that all 
bribery was made through specialized intermediary agents. The driving skill appeared to 
have no impact on the size or acceptance rate of the bribe which resulted in many licensed 
drivers obtaining their license without a test or even any driving lessons. Bertrand et al. 
(2007) conclude that these results support the view that corruption does not merely reflect 
transfers between citizens and officials, but distort allocation as many unsafe drivers got 
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their licenses, while good candidates were denied. This study showcases a creative way to 
study real life corruption with almost laboratory level control.  
Armantier & Boly (2010) is the most recent corruption field experiment related to bribery 
that aimed to study the external validity and differences between results gained from lab 
and field settings. The field experiment was based on lab experiment and conducted in 
Oaugadougou, Burkina Faso except only graders were experiment participants. The 
experiment involved hiring graders to grade 20 dictates out of which exactly 11th one 
contained a bribe with intent to prevent receiving a failing grade. The experimenters used a 
local recruiting firm to hire teachers for a part-time job grading exam papers. The teachers 
were paid 5000FCA which was the going market rate for that kind of work. After validating 
the graders’ credentials the graders were given the time and place for grading. To control for 
the distribution of mistakes the experimenters created a mix of real and fabricated exam 
papers although the bribe paper was typed by a real student from the lab experiment who 
had chosen to offer a bribe. To maintain a legitimate appearance of the task, the experiment 
was conducted at a rented local high school in the center of Oaugadougou.  
On the exam grading day, each grader was randomly assigned a private room that contained 
the specially prepared stack of 20 exam papers. Graders were explicitly instructed to grade 
the papers in order and not to leave the room under any circumstance until the grading was 
complete. They were also told that a supervisor would stop by their room at exactly every 15 
minutes to answer any questions so any disturbances would be predictable and they would 
be certain of their privacy in between.  
The bribe solicitation was written on an easily removable post-it note with a handwritten 
text “Please find few mistakes in my exam paper”. The second page of the 11th exam had a 
bank note securely taped to it not visible under the cover page but noticeable before the 
examiner begun grading the paper. If the examiners decided to report the bribe during a 
supervisor visit, they were instructed to fail the paper automatically and write “fraud 
attempt” in large letters on the exam paper. 
In addition to the control group, the experiment was run in the same three treatments as 
the lab one; high bribe, high wage and increased monitoring. The results were quite similar 
to those of the lab experiment. Graders responded most favorably to higher bribes  while 
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the effect of higher wages remained ambiguous as in many other studies, on one hand they 
lower bribe acceptance rate, but foster reciprocation in case the bribe is taken thus 
providing stability to corruption. Effects of monitoring were ambiguous as well, while they 
did reduce corruption the researchers cannot exclude the possibility of crowding-out 
intrinsic motivation for honesty. Lastly, several micro-determinants of corruption were 
revealed concerning corruptibility. Armantier & Boly (2010) found that age, religiosity and 
ability tended to reduce corruption while gender seemed to have no effect, contrary to 
evidence of previous studies.  
Armantier & Boly (2010) is a bold study of corruption by involving real public servants in a 
simulated corruption, but real to the participants at the time of decision making. All 
participants were told of the experiment afterwards and assured anonymity of results. The 
participants seemed to take the revelation very well and no complaints were received 
although this experiment might edge the line of moral experiments. This however can be a 
necessary evil if the purpose is to study immoral acts.  
4. Experimental motivation 
 
In this chapter I will draw conclusions based on the literature review and methodological 
challenges as well as offer thoughts on future research. What are the critical challenges 
facing corruption research in economics today? How should we proceed to solve them and 
what research areas would yield the highest benefit to the field? I will begin by introducing 
my views on the pressing challenges of corruption research after which I will propose 
possible solutions to them. I will formulate a theoretical background for a future corruption 
experiment based on these conclusions. Finally I will distinguish between the needs of 
experimental execution and experimental planning. 
4.1 Current needs of corruption research 
The complexity of corruption process is so high that no workable model has ever been 
invented that could even remotely reflect the mechanics of the real world. One of the main 
reasons for this is that data to build models from has been extremely difficult to obtain. As 
previously mentioned, observing actual corruption is very hard and corrupt officials or 
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bribing agents rarely keep records of their bribes. In the real world parties involved in 
corruption develop an alternate language where payments are referred as normal and 
accepted business transactions (Della Porta & Vanucci 2005). These can be implicit cultural 
customs or simply the use of highly sophisticated intermediaries who have developed a 
mutual reciprocal understanding with government officials as witnessed in Bertrand et al. 
(2007).  
But complexities of observing corruption do not merely end in secrecy. Other distortionary 
effects play a role in distinguishing corruption from legitimate business. Cultural customs 
and traditions vary from country to country and heavily affect the perspectives of corruption.  
What is regarded as blatant corruption in one country could be held perfectly innocent in 
another. Thus in practice definitions of corruption are not uniform even though academically 
they (finally) are. Perspectives on corruption may also vary not by semi-predictable factors 
like culture, but individual beliefs as well such as “does the government deserve my tax 
money?” If the answer is no, bribing a tax official might not be regarded as corruption at all, 
but as correcting an unjust government policy. This is a critical result in terms of how 
intangible factors will affect utilities and thus decision making of individuals. Making 
incorrect assumptions of intangible costs here may lead to very wrong results. 
Intangible factors of corruption 
This brings us to the importance of intangible costs. Intangible factors such as moral and 
ethical considerations can heavily impact decision making of individuals and lead to very 
different results than those predicted by rational choice game theoretic predictions 
(Klitgaard 1988). Intangible effects are thus the missing link, the dark matter of corruption 
decision process that can explain us the variations from predictions of rational game theory. 
Lab experiments of corruption have often failed to simulate these intangible effects as there 
is no real responsibility in games. Even the very name “economic game” suggests make-
belief leaving critical parts of the brain dormant in the decision process. We do not need 
neuroeconomics to tell us that emotions play a large role in human decision making. As any 
person intuitively knows, people are affected by a multitude of emotions from anger to 
exhilaration that all affect their judgment. Economics readily admits that it is hard to explain 
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the reasons for gambling at a casino or the use of harmful drugs. Knowledge of these 
intangible costs would go a long way explaining the decision making process of corruption. 
While there are many intangible factors in corrupt decision making I now turn to focus on 
those intangible elements that, based on current economics corruption literature, would 
benefit it the most. I’ve identified three categories of intangible mechanics that would 
greatly benefit future corruption research: biasedness of agents to evaluate their own 
morality, effects of group influence in corruption and deeper analysis of the mechanics of 
reciprocity. All of these topics have been popular in other fields of research, but are yet to be 
taken advantage of in the research of corruption. 
Self-serving bias 
Agents are rarely objective in self-evaluation when the ethics or moralities of their actions 
are concerned. In psychology this effect is known as self-serving bias that is often automatic, 
viscerally compelling and unconscious whereas understanding ethical and professional 
obligations requires a more cognitive process. The automatic nature of self-interest gives it a 
primal power to influence judgment which makes it difficult to become aware of it or 
eradicate it (Moore & Loewenstein 2004). Anecdotal evidence of people being good at 
justifying outcomes which unfairly advantage themselves have been also backed by several 
studies (Diekmann at al. 1997) and have been deeply studied in the field of psychology. Thus 
as corruption is an immoral act, methods based on surveys or imaginary games have a 
potential to produce results distorted from reality. Methods that would elicit true responses 
are thus crucial for the study of corruption. 
Group dynamics and norms 
Several experiments have confirmed that group norms affect utility formation. Aspects such 
as inequality aversion also depend on group norms. Humans and animals have all been 
governed by group dynamics for as long as we know. The norms have been observed to 
affect preferences and choices of people in a way that they converge to existing social norms 
(Barr & Serra 2010). This could also explain somewhat why some anticorruption measures 
work in one country and utterly fail in another. Bobkova and Egbert (2012) call for a broader 
perspective to investigate the influence of groups and group norms such as networks on 
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corrupt behavior. “While research on group behavior and effects of individual behavior on 
group members is a standard topic in experimental economics, the transfer to the research 
on corruption has not been exploited yet” 
Reciprocity 
Measuring reciprocity in individuals is a line of research that focuses on this critical element 
of corruption. These studies strive to understand what factors and under which conditions 
affect corruption - the negative reciprocity in individuals. These studies are very important in 
developing a working model of corruption as well as understanding its mechanics. They also 
provide a rich set of data to build assumptions from that in turn can be used as building 
blocks for models. 
Reciprocity as a mechanic is at the very core of bribery. There are at least two important 
reasons that warrant the study of reciprocity in greater detail with regard to corruption. a) 
Experimental evidence shows that anticorruption measures targeting reciprocity produce 
very promising results in curbing corruption (Schikora 2010) and b) Many experiments have 
shown participants spending resources to punish those breaking reciprocity even in one-shot 
games where there is no tangible benefit from punishment (Cameron et al. 2009). This 
clearly indicates that reciprocity has a tangible value and is an important part of utility 
formation. As such it should be measured and investigated more deeply in relation to 
corruption as it helps us closer to building a unified theory of corruption, something that has 
never been successfully done before. 
4.2 Thoughts for future research 
If our goal is to understand the actual dynamics of corrupt behavior and the mechanisms 
through which corruption affects the economy, addressing the issues of intangible costs and 
mechanics of corruption is imperative (Sequeira 2012). Models based on assumption of 
rational choice have failed to explain corruption or come up with policies helping to curb it. 
Some policies have actually backfired and created opposite results than what was expected 
(Schikora 2010). The challenge of observing corruption is high, but given creative and 




Anticorruption policies can be made more complete with increased attention to intangible 
factors in corruption and these can be readily studied through experiments. The fact that 
most of these factors have been long studied in other fields of science such as psychology or 
social sciences makes approaching these issues easier. This makes them a good platform to 
build corruption theory on.  
Group mechanics can be observed through treatments in experimental testing. Some of the 
popular ones yielding interesting results are to make cross-country comparisons like in Barr 
& Serra (2010) where immigrants’ corruption choices converged to that of the native 
residents. Anecdotal evidence from interviews of Russian state company managers and 
businessmen has reinforced this result by confirming that it works in other direction as well 
where initially honest foreign managers converge to corruption practices of the country. 
Another group mechanic worthy of study besides convergence is inequality aversion. Initial 
experimental evidence has shown that corruption that has large externalities compared to 
gains tends to be avoided by individuals (Barr & Serra 2009). Experiments measuring the 
limits of externalities in a group setting through the use of asymmetric payoffs could 
doubtlessly unveil some interesting results. 
Most criminals have a plausible explanation for themselves that justifies their crime and 
corruption is no different. This is why studying the effects of self-serving bias could be crucial 
for deeper understanding of corruption as an individual’s application of moral costs and 
benefits will vary depending on the subjective view of his actions. Performing experiments 
that try to trigger these self-serving biases in various ways could explain the circumstances 
that cause them to emerge. One such way is using framing in field experiments to see how 
people react in various treatments. My interviews of Russian businessmen and officials 
reveals that everyone feels like they have a legitimate reason to be corrupt, even if that 
reason is just that “if I won’t steal/take a bribe then someone else will do it anyway so it’s a 
sunk cost to society”. Further surveys to compile justifications of corrupt officials could 
reveal a consistent thought pattern that might have a lead to an effective solution to 
corruption. 
As bribery revolves around the mechanic of reciprocity, studying it in isolation from other 
factors could reveal its exact magnitude in relation to monetary benefits. It has been 
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established already that knowingly breaking reciprocity triggers moral costs in both the 
breaker and the one betrayed. Interviews with Russian businessmen and officials tell that 
while corruption is condemned, it appears that deceptive corruption – corruption without 
reciprocation – is considered lowest of the low. According to anecdotal evidence, accepting 
a bribe and not delivering have been known to even lead to criminal charges of 
embezzlement! It is clear that reciprocity is an important concept to humans, but little is 
known of the limits of the benefits of reciprocity to individuals and what mechanics govern 
its use. Equally important is to know how it plays into various decision makings. Experiments 
that would measure how much people are willing to pay to avoid breaking reciprocity under 
different circumstances could reveal more of its exact value in decision making process.  
Dichotomy of planning and execution 
The importance of robust experimental planning should not be neglected. The lack of 
resources to conduct fruitful experiments should not stand as an impediment for corruption 
research, but instead motivate those academics to publish papers detailing an innovative 
experimental idea with the hopes having it run by someone else with resources at their 
disposal. It is an academic travesty when schools with huge resources run pointless, but 
expensive experiments while innovative researchers are forced to dilute or abandon their 
experimental ideas. Since experimental study of corruption is still at its infancy I find the 
exchange of ideas of the study of corruption very important for facilitation of robust 
experiments. Considering the great methodological challenges of the field it is important to 
gather more brain power on their development. Thus I greatly encourage more planning and 
discussion about new and creative experimental methods to study corruption and publishing 
more papers that focus purely on planning experiments, if resources to their conduction are 
a constraint. 
5. Experimental design 
 
I begin this chapter with an introduction of a corruption experiment followed with three 
treatments and the questions it is designed to provide answers to. Following the 
introduction of experimental design I will derive the experiment in detail in section 5.1 by 
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laying out my theoretical basis of the experiment and deepen the motivations concerning 
the areas of corruption research it is intended to address.  
Inspired by the methodology of Armantier & Boly (2010) where the same experiment is 
conducted under both lab and field settings I will be designing both lab and field versions of 
this experiment. The interesting question is that do the results differ significantly based on 
the setting? While in their research Armantier & Boly (2010) find they do not, I find it 
worthwhile to explore whether they can be replicated here as well. Chapters 5.2 and 5.3 will 
provide experimental instructions for specific settings; lab and field respectively.  
The main purpose of the experiment is to study whether reciprocation alone can lead to 
corruption. Many people detest the feeling of being indebted to somebody and this can 
create intangible benefits for reciprocating the benefit back.  
The basic experiment 
The experiment, in its most basic form, is an examination of the effects of the results of a 
dictator game followed by an opportunity to act corruptly. In each trial group, there are two 
Proposers and one Receiver.  A proposer is endowed a fixed sum x that they need to split 
with the receiver. The Receiver has no say over the split proportions and simply receives his 
share. This share can range from 0 – 100% of the endowment and is entirely up to the 
Proposer. Neither of the Proposers is aware of the decisions of each other and must be 
examined as independent choices. After the Dictator game, the Receiver must conduct a 
random lottery in order to assign additional lump sum bonus payoff to one of the two 
Proposers. This lottery will be conducted in complete privacy by the Receiver and 
experimenters will not know whether the bonus was truly assigned randomly or arbitrarily. 
The question of interest here is whether possible high shares in the dictator game will cause 
the Receiver to reciprocate by secretly foregoing the lottery and arbitrarily assigning the win 
to the “fairest” Proposer. While the individual choice will be unknown, statistics of the 
lottery winners can reveal if receiving a high share in the Dictator game causes bias in the 
Receiver. The Proposer will naturally not be informed about the existence of the lottery 
before the game.  
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The required amount of wins for the highest paying proposer will depend on the number of 
trials in the experiment. Below is a table for a quick reference that shows the standard error 
associated with a certain number of trials with a 95% confidence. The next two columns 
indicate the lower and upper limit range for the proportion. If the proportion of wins for the 
highest paying is below that it means that paying most money in the dictator game actually 
reduces your chances of winning the lottery while breaking the top range indicates that the 
Receiver is positively biased towards the highest paying Proposers in the lottery. Last column 
“Wins” is a minimum number of wins for the highest paying Proposer needed to show that 
Receivers are biased on average (with 95% confidence). 
Nr of 
trials st error min max 
 
Wins 
100 9,80 % 40,20 % 59,80 % 
 
59,8 
90 10,33 % 39,67 % 60,33 % 
 
54,3 
80 10,96 % 39,04 % 60,96 % 
 
48,8 
70 11,71 % 38,29 % 61,71 % 
 
43,2 
60 12,65 % 37,35 % 62,65 % 
 
37,6 
50 13,86 % 36,14 % 63,86 % 
 
31,9 
40 15,50 % 34,50 % 65,50 % 
 
26,2 
30 17,89 % 32,11 % 67,89 % 
 
20,4 
St.error and confidence bands for 2 player lottery 
The experiment is low tech friendly and can be run in a pen and paper form or as a 
computerized version. In the computerized version it is important to make sure that 
Proposers of the dictator game see the Receiver and Receiver sees them to maintain the 
personal feeling of the game and avoid the payment from being faceless. 
Experiment treatments 
In addition to this basic experiment, I’ve also developed three treatments that can be run to 
deepen the analysis and explore different variables that can affect the corruptibility and 
decision making of the Receiver. These three treatments are: High Benefit, Social variables 
and Framing. 
High Benefit treatment 
The goal of this treatment is to investigate whether increasing the benefit to the Proposer 
(and subsequently the costs to society) will affect the decision making of the Receiver and 
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secondly. It is also interesting to explore if increasing the number of people being cheated 
will reflect in increased moral costs of the Receiver. 
The objective of the “High Benefit” treatment is thus to increase the individual benefit of the 
lottery winner by increasing the number of subjects participating in the lottery. This way the 
expected return of both Proposers changes from P/2 to P/n and the benefit from the corrupt 
act to P - P/n = P(n-1)/n. To keep matters simple the original game stays the same except the 
lottery will be between them and n other people. These people can be randomly picked 
from the subject pool, but do not need to attend the experiment itself, only to receive the 
prize should they win. 
This essentially creates a higher benefit to the Proposer in case the Receiver decides to 
reciprocate. As in the basic game the probability of a Proposer winning the lottery is 50%, in 
a game with 20 players it now becomes only 5%, a ten times smaller chance. The purpose of 
the treatment is to observe whether this would act as a higher externality since in a way 
more people are being cheated in case of corruption. Secondly, it may act as a deterrent 
since it is now less plausible that the Proposer who paid most in the Dictator game would 
come out as a winner.  
Lastly, this treatment is also suitable for situations where the resources of the researchers 
are constrained as this method will greatly lower the standard error of the experiment with 
no additional cost! Below I have complied tables for a case of 5 and 20 players lotteries. 
Trials st error min max Wins 
 
Trials st error min max Wins 
100 7,84 % 12,16 % 27,84 % 27,8 
 
100 4,27 % 0,73 % 9,27 % 9,3 
90 8,26 % 11,74 % 28,26 % 25,4 
 
90 4,50 % 0,50 % 9,50 % 8,6 
80 8,77 % 11,23 % 28,77 % 23,0 
 
80 4,78 % 0,22 % 9,78 % 7,8 
70 9,37 % 10,63 % 29,37 % 20,6 
 
70 5,11 % 0,00 % 10,11 % 7,1 
60 10,12 % 9,88 % 30,12 % 18,1 
 
60 5,51 % 0,00 % 10,51 % 6,3 
50 11,09 % 8,91 % 31,09 % 15,5 
 
50 6,04 % 0,00 % 11,04 % 5,5 
40 12,40 % 7,60 % 32,40 % 13,0 
 
40 6,75 % 0,00 % 11,75 % 4,7 
30 14,31 % 5,69 % 34,31 % 10,3 
 
30 7,80 % 0,00 % 12,80 % 3,8 
      St.error and confidence bands for 5 player lottery        St.error and confidence bands for 20 player lottery 
As can be seen the burden of proof becomes much lower the more participants there are in 
the lottery. For example, suppose we run the basic form game in 80 trials out of which there 
are 7 Receivers that are truly corrupt. Let us further assume that the rest of the lotteries are 
fair and highest paying Proposers win in a proportion that is expected from them. In this 
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case they win approximately 38 times fairly + 7 times when the corrupted Receiver rigs the 
lottery = 45 wins. According to the 2 player table this is not enough to disprove our null 
hypothesis as with 95% confidence the minimum number of wins required will be 48,8! 
However, if the lottery had 20 participants then the highest paying Proposers would win 
approximately 4 of them + the 7 rigged lotteries = 11 wins which is more than the minimum 
win amount in the 20 player lottery table (7,8 wins). This would clearly indicate that 
Receivers on average are biased to the received pay from the Dictator game. 
Social treatment 
This is simply the basic game run with subjects of another culture, preferably from a country 
that scales very differently on a Corruption Perceptions Index than the country whose 
subjects participated in the first version of the game. Depending on the culture it may create 
interesting contrast and shed light on the group norms and dynamics of various cultures. 
These could further offer cues on how these mechanics affect corruption. 
Gender treatment 
A variation of the Social Treatment can be a gender treatment. Experiments focusing on 
detecting variations in decision making based on gender have been relatively popular in 
experimental economics literature (eg: Lambsdorff & Frank 2011). Trials can be run by 
switching the composition of the groups from all men or all women to cross-gender pairings 
where Proposers are women and Receiver a man and vice versa. 
Framing treatment 
In the framing treatment the Receiver’s instructions also include an economic analysis of the 
Dictator game stating that the game theoretically optimal solution for the Proposer would 
be to give nothing. This has twofold purpose, the first being to stress the nature of 
reciprocity. The Receiver is made aware that any money paid to him is simply from the 
goodness of the Proposer’s heart and thus might place the Receiver in a stronger feeling of 
indebtedness. Secondly, this treatment studies the self-serving bias where the Proposer is 
given a moral sounding excuse to cheat in the lottery for the benefit of the highest paying 
Proposer. This could be something like “fair behavior must be rewarded”. 
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5.1. Theoretical basis 
 
This experiment was developed based on the needs of the field discussed in the previous 
chapter as well as to maximize the realism of corruption and bribery. The driving forces of 
the experimental design are unobservability and existence of real intangible costs and 
benefits. I will now show how the various parts of the experiment were derived based on 
these requirements. 
Unobservability 
As in the real world, bribes are rarely given explicitly and in many cases are not mere cash, 
but something harder to evaluate like objects or intangible benefits. These can be favors and 
services such as dinners and vacation trips. They are usually passed completely tacitly with a 
vague implicit suggestion of reciprocity at most (Della Porta & Vanucci 2005). Thus I find it 
important to focus more on the study of bribes as gifts rather than as explicit bribes.   
The most important parts of a good corruption research would be the presence of real moral 
issue and real or believed unobservability. The subject must believe that the corrupt activity 
will remain unknown and only between the parties of exchange. Otherwise it may tamper 
with the responses since people do not like to think of themselves committing immoral acts. 
Also, in most corruption situations there is a framing effect where the participants frame the 
interaction in a way other than immoral corruption, but as a gift exchange, a business 
transaction or as some other seemingly legitimate affair. This can also make observing 
corruption more difficult as it is usually clad in a veil of legitimacy. Thus I plan to measure 
corruption through aggregates in the experiment instead of being able to single out who 
acted corruptly. The results will tell whether people contributing the most in a Dictator game 
will be lucky in a statistically significant way in the subsequent lottery. 
Intangible effects 
It is important to note that in none of the reviewed lab experiments were moral costs 
sufficiently captured. Maximizing your own payoffs in a game is hardly immoral nor is the act 
of refusing to give money to a charity. Even if the choices of the players indirectly affected 
the amount of money a charity would receive, it can still be compared to a player giving 
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money to the charity directly and simply neglecting to do so is not immoral in itself even if 
some people might misguidedly believe so. In any case I consider it a poor proxy to simulate 
moral costs.  
Laboratory experiments are usually well controlled and would provide interesting results if 
not for the absence of real moral costs. First, as Levitt & List (2007) mention, actual 
corruption in laboratory setting is hard to achieve since corruption involves an immoral act 
which does not really happen in a simulated setting. In any problem of moral choice it is 
relevant to have some real moral consequences in the experiment or else the parts of the 
brain that controls moral decision making won’t activate and the results may vary 
significantly from a real life situation. To involve the moral costs in a lab experiment there 
has to be some form of dishonesty that the participant does not perceive to merely be a part 
of the game. Without resorting to deception, we can run a game followed by a survey and an 
opportunity to deceive. Holding the position of the principal here will be the researchers and 
to some extent other players. To achieve the feeling of real guilt (and because games are not 
necessarily perceived as having any real impact besides the imagined) the goal of the 
experiment must be to get the subject to cheat the experimenters by violating their 
instructions.  
Self-serving bias 
Self-serving bias in corruption are essentially excuses that justify the act of corruption in the 
mind of the official. These excuses serve to act as counter to moral costs that come from 
corruption and work like moral benefits of corruption. A human psyche is very capable of 
defending itself from negative feelings and able to reason out most immoral acts. When 
criminals are asked what were they thinking when they were committing the crime, they 
respond that they understood that what they were doing was wrong, but they had some 
excuse, no matter how implausible to explain that they were forced to commit the crime. 
These self-serving biases are very prevalent in the real world corruption and studying them is 
imperative if we want to use intangible costs in anticorruption policies. The experiment 
studies these biases through the reciprocity effect and intangible costs it may cause to an 
individual, especially in the framing treatment. The potential misguided belief that “fairness” 
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must be rewarded stands here as the self-serving excuse as it is come at the expense of 
others.  
Reciprocity 
Naturally reciprocity serves as the starting point of my experiment as existing studies are 
pointing that the key to corruption lies in reciprocity. The most noteworthy aspect of this 
experiment regarding reciprocity is that its effects can be studied in isolation here. Culturally 
the effects of reciprocity have been known for a very long time. Many cultures, especially 
oriental, have gift giving built in as part of good manners without any explicit or implicit 
request of reciprocation. It is as if people are expected to instinctively feel the need to 
reciprocate. Everybody probably has friends or family members who abhor exchanging 
birthday or holiday gifts claiming feelings of discomfort that come from not giving, but 
receiving gifts. This anecdotal evidence points to the fact that there is something about 
reciprocity built in into human brain that naturally motivates people to reciprocate a free 
benefit. 
The experiment studies the effects of reciprocity in isolation. The payment serving the role 
of a would-be bribe is given with no request of reciprocation as Proposers are not even 
aware of the lottery the Receiver is going to conduct. Naturally, the Receiver has no other 
reason to reciprocate aside for the sake of reciprocity itself. Nothing was asked from him, 
even implicitly so he is under no obligation to favor the highest paying Proposer. This 
experiment thus investigates that can there exist corruption even under ideal conditions 
when gifts are involved. 
A hot topic regarding governance and politics is the existence of the lobby industry. It is clear 
that lobbyists provide some sort of benefits to the politicians and get something in return. In 
Finland there have been lots of discussions regarding the relationships between big business 
and politicians. Lots of new legislation has also been passed regarding campaign 
contributions and gifts officials and politicians can receive. This experiment may help shape 






Lastly, the group norms and dynamics are examined through the social variables treatment. I 
call these social variables instead of cultural since it doesn’t necessarily have to be cross-
country comparison, but can be run between different social classes, age groups or 
employments.  
As there are two players in the game, the Receiver will be able to compare the splits of the 
endowment. In an ideal case, one Proposer will give nothing while the other Proposer will 
split the money evenly. This will create the greatest contrast and make the high money 
Proposer to stand out. This will act as a signal to the Receiver of the group norms whether 
high payments are special or not.  
5.2. Experiment – Laboratory 
 
The instructions of a lab experiment must be specific and delivered to all subjects in as 
identical manner as possible. This is usually accomplished via written or pre-recorded audio 
instructions. I recommend written instructions in this case as people can re-read parts they 
might find confusing. 
While subjects are randomly assigned the roles of the Proposers and Receivers, the two 
must be kept separated at the start of the experiment. This can be accomplished by having 
them come to read their instructions in separate rooms. After having read instructions for 
their roles, they are led to a third room with Receiver first. The Receiver takes a seat at a 
table, knowing already that his role is just to receive the money. The first Proposer is then 
led into the room and he will see the Dictator game question on a paper into which he will 
need to fill out two numbers; the amount he will take for himself of the endowment and the 
amount he assigns to the Receiver. The Proposer can see the Receiver, but any 
communication is forbidden. After the Proposer has filled out the form he may leave the 
room to fill out a questionnaire (see Appendix). 
After each Proposer has completed the form, the results are shown to the Receiver. Once 
the second Proposer has completed the task he is led away by the experimenter to answer 
his questionnaire. The Proposer is left alone in the room to fill out his questionnaire in which 
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the last point asks him to perform the lottery amongst the two Proposers and two other 
unknown students. The instructions say to use an ordinary dice that will be placed on the 
table prior to the experiment. After writing in the winner on the questionnaire, the Proposer 
seals his answers in an envelope and drops it into a collection box. This will guarantee the 
anonymity to the Receivers. 
The experiment can be run with x Proposers and n lottery participants. As the Receiver 
needs to be paid a fixed fee for his service, w, I recommend it being proportionate to the 
endowment in the Dictator game by a factor of half. If we call the Receiver’s “wage” w and 
the Dictator game endowment αw, a cost of one trial would be  
αwP + w + V and cost of one treatment (αwP + w + V)g 
where αw is the Dictator game endowment, P is the number of Proposers, V is the value of 
the lottery prize and g the number of trials. A suitable number of trials could be 80 trials 
which would give us a standard error of 8,77% under 95% confidence (Z = 1,96) in a five 
person lottery. Increasing the number of trials or lottery participants will decrease the 
standard error.  
5.3. Experiment - Field 
 
Bertrand et al. (2007) showed how they measured the corruptibility of driving exam officials 
in India. This gave the idea of studying officials in charge of examinations to study 
corruptibility. In place of driving exam instructors, teachers can be used for the field version 
of this thesis’ lab experiment. In this case there needs to be only one student who gives a 
gift at the end of a course, after grades have been posted, to the course lecturer. Since 
money is too implausible a gift, other gifts such as a box of chocolates, a bottle of wine or 
some other corporate style gift can be used. Also to avoid the feeling of being bribed, only 
students who received the highest grade are to be used. This way the gift will feel as a 
selfless act.  
Following this, the teacher is informed he has to perform a surprise lottery amongst the 
highest grade students of the class by his superior to randomly award a prize “from a school 
sponsor”. The rest is just an analysis of the results. The experiment is relatively lightweight 
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as it requires only one student and one teacher per trial and the teacher doesn’t even need 
to be paid for experiment participation for obvious reasons. For efficiency, this experiment 
could be run simultaneously on as many teachers per school as possible. The concurrent 
lotteries of other courses would add to the credibility to the story of a “school sponsor”.   
6. Experiment Analysis 
 
In this section I will outline some of the ways that can be used in analyzing the results of the 
experiment. These ways include variables of interest and general statistics of the outcomes 
of the Dictator game and the lottery. Additionally I will make five hypotheses that should be 
answered with the experiment. Naturally the most critical result will be whether there can 
be detected any statistically significant winning probability of individual’s paying the most in 
the Dictator game. If the answer is negative, the effect of treatments should be analyzed.  
6.1 Explanatory variables 
The results of most economic corruption experiments are followed by a regression analysis 
in which the experimenters attempt to form a model based on certain variables of interest 
that can differentiate between the participants. Economists often analyze a wide array of 
explanatory variable in corruption experiments this way. The aim of such analysis is to refine 
the results of the experiment and attempting to identify the reasons why some participants’ 
decisions might differ from others. For the purposes of this section I have grouped these 
variables of interest under three main categories; Personal, Game and Status. 
Personal variables are those that apply to an individual’s personal characteristics. These can 
be:  






Age and religiosity are especially interesting as Armantier & Boly (2011) found them very 
significant in reducing corruption. Game variables of interest are those that relate to the 
actions taken during the Dictator game. These are: 
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 The difference between Proposers’ payments 
 Event of no payment from anyone (as dummy variable)  
 The value of payment (expected to be increasing with the probability of winning).  
Lastly, status variables are variables that describe the subject’s cultural or social status. 
 Residential status (has the subject lived in the country for more than 1 year?),  
 Work sector (public/private) 
 Country of origin’s CPI value 
6.2 Hypotheses 
To clarify the most interesting results of the experiment, I have listed several hypotheses 
regarding the decision making of the subjects. The main expectation is that the free money 
received in the Dictator game will establish a feeling of reciprocity in the receiver causing 
him to reciprocate to the highest payer. This brings us the first hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: Proposer who paid the most wins most often. This effect is correlated with 
the difference between the payments to the Receiver of the two Proposers. 
This is a fairly straightforward supposition where the highest paying Proposer wins. Since 
money can be received only from those who play the Dictator game, it stands to reason that 
as the contribution of other participants of the lottery to the Receiver is zero, a form of 
reciprocity can be established between the players as a group. This might lead to non-
players to become excluded from the lottery in case the players decide on making a 
payment to the Receiver. 
Hypothesis 2: Proposers tend to win more often in general than others. 
The focus of the High Benefit treatment is whether increased externalities and lessened 
plausibility of the rigged lottery result will lead to a decrease in corruption. As the briber's 
behavior either reflects his fear of getting caught or aversion to corruption (Schulze & Frank, 
2003) the Receiver might be less willing to cheat a large number of people or might think 





Hypothesis 3: Receivers in High Benefit-treatment tend to be more honest than in other 
treatments. 
In countries where corruption is more rampant people are more used to reciprocating favors 
and acting corruptly as the experiment in Barr & Serra (2010) revealed. This result can be 
replicated as a social treatment in this experiment as well by comparing them with a group 
from the low CPI countries.  
Hypothesis 4: People from countries ranking poorly on Corruption Perceptions Index tend 
to reciprocate more often than people from countries ranking well on CPI. 
In the Framing treatment the instructions introducing the Dictator game to the Receiver are 
written in a neutral and explaining the economic viability of zero payment. While still not 
under any moral obligation to share the money, those people who do are expected to look 
particularly positive in the eyes of the Receiver. Thus I form the first part of the fifth 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5a: Proposers in Framing-treatment who pay the most win more often than in 
the basic version. 
This effect is expected to work in other way as well as in cases where the payments are small, 
Proposers are looked upon as greedy and unfair individuals. This may cause a punishment 
effect where they will both be excluded from the subsequent lottery. 
Hypothesis 5b: In cases where both Proposers pay very little or nothing Proposers tend to 
win disproportionately less often than non-Proposers (High benefit treatment). 
 
6.3 Follow-up research possibilities 
There are many interesting research possibilities to follow-up on in case there will be 
evidence to support the existence of reciprocal activity from the Receiver. I will now briefly 






Based on the result of their lab experiments, Abbink et al. (2002) conclude that reciprocity 
can establish bribery relationships in which negative externalities have no apparent effect. 
This means that once reciprocity relationship is established, it becomes easier to proceed 
from gifts to bribery. This effect could be studied in a follow up experiment studying pure 
bribery and compared to how Proposer-Receiver pairs in which potential corruption was 
detected compare to others. Would this unintended corruption on the Proposer’s part make 
the Receiver more receptive to an actual bribe proposal from the same individual? 
Multiple-round game 
As corruption in the real world is rarely a one-time isolated event it would be even more 
realistic to perform the experiment several times in succession. Anecdotal and experimental 
(Abbink et al. 2002) evidence points that once reciprocal relationships have been established 
they remain quite stable. This means that the deterrence to corruption works best only the 
first time and in the subsequent opportunities of corruption the moral costs are not as high 
anymore. The experiment could be run during the course of 5-7 weeks once a week to see if 
there will develop such completely implicit relationship where the Proposer assigns a fair 
share to the Receiver in exchange for a guaranteed win in the lottery. In this case it is 
imperative to promise anonymity to the Receiver that experimenters would not be able to 
trace the rigged lottery back to the Receiver. On the other hand, a treatment effect could 
create a risk of punishment to test its deterrence effect. 
7. Conclusion   
 
This thesis had three main aims: introduction of foundational theory of corruption, review of 
methodologies and design of an exemplary corruption experiment that furthers field.  
As corruption is a highly nuanced and complex matter it was necessary to begin with a 
thorough introduction of the theoretical foundation of the concept. Since the emergence of 
corruption research in economics, great definitional debates had raged for many decades 
until settling to define corruption as an abuse of public office for private gain. However this 
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definition is far from exhaustive as there are many aspects to corruption from both 
theoretical and practical points of view. For this reason the first chapter of the thesis served 
to introduce corruption in economics from both theoretical and practical perspective.  
The theoretical part consisted of the various forms and categories of corruption that are 
important to be aware of when reading any corruption related literature. The most 
important being the difference between grassroots and high-level corruption as methods to 
fight or research them vary greatly. Grassroots corruption is often a collective action 
problem where agents engage in corruption in mass. High-level corruption on the other 
hand is often much more calculated and secretive resulting in great public scandal when 
discovered.  Further nuances introduced are efficient and self-reinforcing corruption as well 
as various assumptions regarding the principal. While this may look as nitpicking on a first 
glance, these assumption have very strong effects on the outcomes of the corruption models. 
For example incorrectly assuming a principal is benevolent when he is not will just lead to 
corruption rents accumulating in the hands of the principal. 
From the practical point of view the world history of corruption shows that corruption is a 
very old problem and just as dangerous as it was before if not more so in the age of nuclear 
weapons where collapse of large states can easily wreak havoc on a global scale. This is 
contrasted by the fact that in terms of academic interest from the side of economics, 
corruption is a very new topic whose research is at just beginning to develop in earnest. 
Monetary estimates by the World Bank Institute indicate that the value of bribery alone is 
over one trillion US dollars on a global scale. Unfortunately the monetary costs are not the 
only costs to be concerned about as corruption carries political and social costs as well that 
are hard if not impossible to quantify in monetary terms. The concept of efficient corruption 
that has been popular in economics of the previous century can be welfare increasing, but 
only if there exist major harmful policies that they serve to circumvent. As such, efficient 
corruption is always based on a second-best reasoning which is hardly an efficient solution.  
Anecdotal evidence of mechanics of corruption reveals highly systemic yet informal practices 
that make research and observation difficult. To categorize these mechanics I propose a 
matrix of corruption that assigns corruption along two dimensions. The first one questions 
whether the public loses any existing resources or not while the second focuses on the 
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initiating party of the corruption. Four different types of corruption emerge from this 
division; kickbacks, embezzlement, grease money and extortion that help quickly categorize 
the dominant mechanics. Application of traditional economic methods reveals that while 
corruption does respond to economic incentives eliminating it entirely can be economically 
unviable. The results of such analysis are obviously limited to tangible costs and do not take 
into account political or social costs of corruption or the possibility that utility functions of 
individuals may depend on the aggregate levels of corruption. 
As a conclusion to the theoretical foundation of corruption I reviewed and introduced the 
anticorruption policies concluding that economists today cannot provide general 
recommendations for anticorruption policies and each case must be tackled on individual 
basis. This is accentuated even more in the fact that approaches to anticorruption can rely 
either on the state or its people, top-down and bottom-up approaches respectively. Both 
methods have merit and their effectiveness depends on the mechanics of corruption at hand. 
Bottom-up approach works best where citizens can readily observe corruption and have 
sufficient knowledge of the resource being misused. Top-down approach is more suited to 
behind-the-scenes type of corruption or one that requires sophistication or auditing powers 
to observe. In addition to the correct approach any anticorruption policy must have a 
solution to avoid three common pitfalls; Transference, Red tape and Capture as described in 
chapter 1.5. These dilemmas make any anticorruption policy a two-edged sword that can 
result in an increase of corruption instead of decrease. 
Overall the theoretical foundation of corruption is large and complex like the issue itself, but 
necessary to be understood. Otherwise a researcher runs the risk of mischaracterization of 
the issue or employing unrealistic assumptions. 
Research Methodologies of Corruption in Economics 
There are five main methodologies employed in corruption research: Perception indices, 
surveys, observation, lab experiments and field experiments. While studies based on 
perception indices and surveys are becoming scarce in economic corruption literature, 
observation and experimental methods have become much more prominent. Much of the 
recent surge in experimental literature has been accredited to the new revolutionary 
methodologies in the form of experimental approach. I have introduced and discussed the 
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merits and challenges of each method as each has its own strengths and weaknesses and is 
suited for different parts of corruption research. 
I wanted to highlight the recent revolutionary progress in the methodology of the field that 
is largely to thank for the great increase of interest in the topic in the economics community. 
In addition to this I’ve conducted an exhaustive literature review relating to experimental 
corruption studies of bribery as precursors to my experimental design. The focus of the 
experimental studies of bribery has been the underlying determinants of corruption. These 
can be divided into three categories; tangible determinants, intangible determinants and 
intermediaries. The main goal of the first two categories is to study mechanics of corruption 
of individual decision making while the last category investigates a specific method of 
conducting corrupt affairs – using an intermediary. Studies show that the use of an 
intermediary greatly facilitates corruption above any other determinant. Empirical evidence 
seems to point to the same conclusion as much of the high level corruption is conducted 
through intermediaries colloquially known as power brokers. The most exciting and potential 
form of methodology appears to be field experimentation as it manages to effectively 
capture all relevant determinants. The challenge is however not merely the cost, but the 
difficulty of designing experiments that need to be carefully balanced in order to not actually 
break the law.  
Corruption Experiment 
On the foundation of existing corruption theory and experimental research I’ve designed a 
corruption experiment based on best practices of the field with the aim of producing results 
that can offer critical findings into the mechanics of corruption. While it is unrealistic to 
expect these findings alone will explain corruption, they will provide a very used part in its 
explanation. I’ve planned a laboratory experiment in detail with an additional design of 
running it as a field experiment without the subjects’ knowledge.  
While not having the resources to conduct it myself, it is important that more innovative 
research designs are developed if funding is an issue. Developing a sound economic 
experiment is often underestimated as a task that can result in poor quality results. This can 
be due to statistical issues such as too small sample size or a poorly formed theoretical basis 
that overlooks critical mechanics of corruption.  
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Thoughts for the future corruption research 
I hope this thesis will inspire more economists to get interested in studying corruption and 
serve as a solid starting point in familiarizing themselves with the subject. Additionally I hope 
this work will help economists plan and conduct experimental methods in the study of 
corruption, even if they have no resources to run it themselves. The field requires innovative 
research techniques that don’t necessarily come hand in hand with resources. 
I wish to encourage more economists unfamiliar with experimental economics to try these 
new methodologies in corruption research and especially move out of the lab and bravely 
attempt field experiments as well. Progress in corruption research has not been achieved 
from inside an office. While the number of lab experiments in corruption has mushroomed 
during the last decade, the number of field experiments remains only a handful yet all have 
provided fascinating results. 
Until now a bulk of corruption research has also been focused on approximating the amount 
of corruption from macro data. This unfortunately does little to explain the underlying 
determinants of corruption and help formulate anticorruption policies. Thus more research 
needs to be focused on trying to explain mechanics of corruption rather than merely trying 
to measure it on macroeconomic level. 
Lastly, we should take advantage from the collusion with other fields such as psychology and 
criminal science as they have studied many areas relevant to corruption. There is no reason 
to reinvent discoveries well established in other disciplines from scratch. Particular 
advantage should be taken of neuroeconomics to shed light on the neural underpinnings of 









Appendix: Experiment Instructions 
 
In this appendix you will find the instructions and sample questionnaires given to the 
participants of the experiment.  
Instructions to the Proposer 
Many thanks for participating in this experiment which runs as follows: After having finished 
reading these instructions you will be led to another room where you will have to make a 
decision on a sum of money. Your decision will be final and payment will be processed 
according to your decision alone. 
You are not to communicate with anyone in the room except the experimenters. After 
making your decision, leave the paper on the table and exit the room to fill out a 
questionnaire upon which your participation in the experiment is concluded. 
Your ID is:   
 
 
Instructions to the Proposer inside the Experiment room 
There is a sum of money [insert sum]. Please specify a portion between 0% - 100% below. 
I take _________ percent. 








Instructions to the Receiver 
Many thanks for participating in this experiment. You have been chosen to be an 
independent observer and for this service the experimenters will be paying you [insert sum] 
salary. The experiment runs as follows: After having finished reading these instructions you 
will be led to another room where you will observe another person making a decision on a 
sum of money of [insert sum]. He will decide what portion of the money (0% - 100%) he will 
take for himself. The rest will be left to you, added to your existing salary of [insert sum].  
You will observe two decision makers A and B after which you will be asked to complete a 
brief form. Once you’re done, put it in an envelope and drop it into the collection box by the 
door. Exit the room and your participation in the experiment is completed. 
Your ID is:   
 
Instructions to the Receiver - (Framing Treatment) 
Many thanks for participating in this experiment. You have been chosen to be an 
independent observer and for this service the experimenters will be paying you [insert sum] 
salary. The experiment runs as follows: After having finished reading these instructions you 
will be led to another room where you will observe another person making an economic 
decision on a sum of money of [insert sum]. This is called a Dictator experiment where he 
will decide what portion of the money (0% - 100%) he will take for himself. The rest will be 
left to you, added to your existing salary of [insert sum]. The game theoretic, economically 
rational choice is to take 100% of the money as there is no benefit in sharing the money for 
the decision maker. 
You will observe two decision makers A and B after which you will be asked to complete a 
brief form. Once you’re done, put it in an envelope and drop it into the collection box by the 
door. Exit the room and your participation in the experiment is completed. 















Country or origin:_______________________ 
 
Lived in this country for more than one year:_____yes    ______no 
 
-----------------------------------------Receiver’s questionnaire only------------------------------------------ 
The experimenters wish to thank the decision making participants by raffling off [insert 
prize] amongst five decision makers A through E. Please use the dice on the table to draw 
the winner. 
Circle the winner: 
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